

# The Dynamics of Narcoterrorism in Indonesia

## Case Study: Fadli Sadama

Albert Bobby Prasetya, S.E<sup>1</sup>, Dr. Muhamad Syauqillah<sup>2</sup>  
{abpwibisono@gmail.com<sup>1</sup>; muhamadsyauqillah@ui.ac.id<sup>2</sup>}

<sup>1,2</sup> School of Strategic and Global Studies, Universitas Indonesia

**Abstract.** One of the challenges faced by the Indonesian government lately is the fight against terrorism and the misuse and illegal trade of narcotics. In supporting its objectives, this activity involves a network of transnational crimes that take root and penetrate national borders. This makes the barriers of illegal trade to be meaningless. To ensure national security and public security, the state is present and declares war on terror, equivalent to the fight against narcotics. This research tries to answer the research that has been done by Alex Schmid entitled Links Between Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: A Case of Narco-Terrorism which questioned the weak evidence about the linkage between narcotics in financing support of terrorism. This research is explanative with in-depth interview method, field observation to former terrorist prisoner Fadli Sadama as primary source and supported by secondary data source in the form of literature study as supporting material. This research contains the factors of ideology, geography, social culture and economics as the factors causing narcoterrorism in Indonesia. The theory used in this research is, rational choice theory and routine activity theory. The results show that economic factors are the predominant factor of narcoterrorism in Indonesia and it is evident that the results of narcotics trade are used as support in terrorist activities in Indonesia.

**Keyword:** narcoterrorism, drug trafficking, terrorism funding, transnational organized crime

## 1 Introduction

Indonesia is an archipelago consisting of 18,108 islands consisting of 2.8 million kilometers of water (92,877 sq km of inland waters), 1,826,440 square kilometers of land. When calculated with the Exclusive Economic Zone (ZEE), the Indonesian Territory stretches an area of 7.9 million square kilometers (Cribb & Ford, 2009). As an archipelagic country, sea transportation mode becomes one of the means of connecting between islands in Indonesia, also between Indonesia and other countries. More than 750,000 dockings per year in Indonesian ports carrying more than 300 million tons of cargo, and more than 14 million people traveling by sea each year (Cribb & Ford, 2009). Overall, the total value of marine trade in the archipelago of Indonesia is worth US \$ 300 billion in the Malacca Strait, US \$ 40 billion in the Lombok Strait and US \$ 5 billion in the Sunda Strait (Sumaryono, 2009).

However, with such competitive advantage, paradoxically, the Indonesian sea as a source of security threats and national vulnerability. The threats include: the illegal trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and narcotics (ICG, 2010), illegal crossing of Indonesians to

neighboring countries (Hugo, 1993), illegal immigrant issues from abroad who will live in Indonesia and heading to Australia (Hunter, 2006).

In addition to the conventional security threats, one of the non-traditional security threats that the Indonesian government pays attention to is the crime of narcoterrorism. Narcoterrorism is simply an activity of illegal drug trafficking (drug trafficking) aimed at supporting the operational activities of terrorism. UNODC (2012) categorizes drug trafficking as and terrorism as a transnational organized crime (TNOc). Other crimes included in the TNOc category include human trafficking, migrant smuggling, illegal firearms trade, natural resource trade, illegal wildlife trade, sale of counterfeit drugs, cyber crime.

Mueller (1998) defines transnational crime as "... criminal phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of some states or having an impact on another country ". According to Martin & Romano (1992): "transnational crime may be defined as the behavior of a criminal by at least one of these nations". Findlay (2003) states that transnational crime is a social phenomenon involving people, places and groups that are also influenced by various social factors, cultural factors and economic factors

The United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) seeks to define narcoterrorism as the participation of related groups or individuals in burdening, providing security for, or assisting and abetting by narcotics trafficking in an effort to continue or fund terrorist activities (cited in Bjornhed, 2004, p. 306). Ehrenfeld (1990) defines narcoterrorism as the use of narcotics trade to advance the goals of a particular government or organization.

The case of narcoterrorism successfully revealed by the Police of the Republic of Indonesia is the case of Fadli Sadama. Fadli Sadama, a 36-year-old man, became a concern in 2013 for a series of crimes he committed. He has a network of transnational crimes (transnational organized crime). Fadli used commission proceeds from drug sales smuggled from Malaysia to buy weapons to support bank robberies in the city of Medan. The money from the robbery was used to buy weapons from Southern Thailand. Fadli is working with the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and the narcotics network in Malaysia to support its activities of smuggling drugs and weapons into Indonesian territory. (Ramelan, 2017)

Based on the literature search conducted by researchers, research on narcoterrorism in Indonesia is still minimal and not deep. Based on the literature search conducted by the author, narcoterrorism research in Indonesia discusses the analysis of the factors driving and inhibiting narcoterrorism in Indonesia in the perspective of intelligence. In this study, researchers identified factors causing narcoterrorism in the context of support for financing terrorist activities.

## **2 Literature Review**

Cornish & Clarke (1986) states that at the heart from the perspective of rational choice lies the assumption that criminals are goal-oriented and try to show a measure of rationality at some level they consider the potential costs and benefits of crime and act accordingly Paternoster & Bachman (2001) the beginning of the rational choice perspective that crime was chosen because of its crime benefits. Rational choice theory asserts that if the benefits of crime are high and costs are low, then crime will occur. If the benefits of crime are higher than the cost, then the crime will not happen. The implication of this theory is that if the cost of crime is made to be high it will be the perpetrator of a rational crime to be confined or prevented from committing a crime.

Keel (1997) outlines the main points of emphasis from Rational Choice Theory:

- 1) Man is a rational actor;
- 2) Rationality involves final counting / means;
- 3) People (freely) choose behavior, both appropriate and distorted, based on their rational calculations,
- 4) The main element of calculation involves cost benefit analysis. Pleasure versus pain or hedonic calculus,
- 5) Choice, with all other similar conditions, will be directed to maximize the pleasure of the individual,
- 6) Options can be controlled through perception and understanding of potential pain or punishment that will follow actions considered to violate social good, social contracts,
- 7) The State is responsible for maintaining order and preserving the common good through the legal system (this system is the embodiment of the social contract),
- 8) The speed, severity, and certainty of punishment are the key elements in understanding the legal ability to control human behavior

Felson (1987) and Cohen & Felson (1979) point out that routine activity builds the opportunity frame of a crime. Brantingham & Brantingham (1993) states that both motivated offenders and opportunities for crime are uniformly distributed in time and space. Certain types of crime tend to be closely related to the target locations and regular travel patterns of potential violators. Target locations and potential offenders typically vary with day time, certain target characteristics and sites and situations around the target.

In line with the Cornish & Clarke (1986) theory, Paternoster & Bachman (2001), and Keel (1997), Methamphetamine-type smuggling and narcotics activities conducted by Fadli Sadama have taken into account the rational choice and cost and benefit aspect logic. The benefits gained by Fadli Sadama have been utilized and channeled to the needy parties as per the personal wishes of Fadli Sadama. Economic factors are the dominant factor among the ideological factors and the geographical factors that cause narcoterrorism. Fadli chose to earn as much money as possible in the shortest time possible.

In line with the theory of Felson (1987) and Cohen & Felson (1979) Selection of smuggling routes is done by first studying the location and situation on the border of Malaysia, the border of Indonesia and the border of Southern Thailand.

### **3 Discussion**

#### **3.1. The Profile and Involvement of Fadli Sadama in Narcoterrorism**

Fadli Sadama bin Mahmudin aka Acin was born in Dai Lingga, Pekanbaru City, Indonesia on September 27, 2011. His educational background is high school with mediocre achievement. He has expertise in the areas of watch repairs, English and computer. In the field of education, he has experience teaching English and Computer. Fadli Sadama rarely communicates with his parents and family, but his relationship with the family is well established when he is incarcerated in prison Salemba. (Sadama, 2018)

Fadli undergo Islamic religious services such as Friday prayers and recitation in accordance with Islamic sharia in general. He has a somewhat closed personality, so the family is unaware of Fadli's activities outside the home. He has a good motivation in working because from high school has a job as a trader, so he has an income though not fixed.

The beginning of the journey Fadli Sadama dabbling in the world of radicalism and narcoterorisme starting from recitation activities in Khairu Ummah Foundation, Pekanbaru in 2000. In the mosque found in the Foundation he was acquainted with Ustad Nur Iswanto. As a good Muslim, Fadli wanted to explore the teachings of religion that had not been too much of a concern. In the teaching was taught the topic (1) Faith, (2) Aqidah and (3) jihad. The material of jihad is given to members who have been studying for a long time. For new members only taught belief, faith, prayer. For people who are interested in more deeply, will be taught the problem of jihad, Islamic Shari'a. The jihad that is taught is how the whole world, especially Indonesia is subject to Islamic Shari'a. The most influential figure for Fadli Sadama is Abdullah Azzam with his book Tarbiyah Jihadiyah.

Stages performed:

- 1) Invite / preach the community to understand Islamic Shari'a
- 2) If the object of da'wah does not receive the preaching, then it must be fought. The point is how the society is subject, either voluntarily or necessarily

Since 2000 Fadli has been studying at the Khairu Ummah Foundation. Fadli is seen as a potential people, so that he is invited to be more intensive. Once upon a time there was Ustad Joko Murtopo from Lampung deliberately invited to Fadli. He was pleased with the enthusiasm that Fadli showed.

At the time of the riots in Ambon in 2001, Fadli was sent to Ambon. His duties in Ambon became the treasurer and secretary of the Group Laskar Mujahidin, all of whom were Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). During Di Ambon, Fadli participated in the Group Laskar Mujahidin training. Stage in the Group Laskar Mujahidin training:

- 1) Training the use of weapons, open pairs of weapons,
- 2) Field engineering training (manufacture and use of bombs on a small scale)
- 3) Basic military training and infantry tactics (marching lines)
- 4) Training map reading
- 5) Studies that emphasize the importance of jihad

For a month Fadli was placed in Kebon Cengkeh Housing Complex, Ambon. The one who drove him to Ambon was Imam Samudra, Toni togar a.k.a Indra Warman on the recommendation letter from Ustad Joko Murtopo. He was escorted from Pekanbaru to Padang and then to Ambon for 7 days aboard a ferry. The training in Ambon was held for one month. After that he was placed in the office (part treasurer and secretary).

Other Fadli associates are stationed on the border of Muslim-Christian conflict, some are assigned to teach. That's where Fadli got acquainted with one of the executor of the bomb exploded in Paddys Club. Imam Samudera then offered to Fadli: "Want to come or not?" Fadli did not understand what was meant by the question whether or not to come. Then he understood that he was offered to participate in the 2002 Bali Bomb project (Bali Bomb I). Fadli offered to work in the context of amaliyah (jihad) but what task and target, he has not been given more info.

The Fadli time period in Ambon is 4 months, one month of training followed by 3 months in the office of finance and secretary concurrently administration by recording volunteers who come from various regions including Java. Funding sources come from donor donations in various regions of Indonesia. In October 2001 Fadli came to Ambon, in February 2002 he returned to Pekanbaru. Arriving in Pekanbaru, Fadli worked with Amir Fadli while in Ambon named Muhammad Zaki. The organizational structure of Mujahidin Laskar Group consists of: Chairman-Vice-Chairman-Treasurer / Secretary-Member. Amir named Muhammad Zaki invites Fadli to work with him in the welding workshop. During his work, he also participated in teachings that taught about Jihad.

In April 2003, Toni Togar alias Indra Warman came to Pekanbaru. Toni invites Fadli to do amaliyah with the argument: "At another jihad, you are busy working." Fadli follows Toni Togar's invitation and then asks where he will work. Toni replied: "do not have to work, for what work, just rob the banks !"

Fadli was given the task of conducting a survey at Lippo Bank, one of the robbery target options he would do. Every day Fadli sent a report to Toni togar via e-mail. A few days later he was introduced to the perpetrators of the robbery. But Fadli did not communicate with them after that. Fadli's communication is only with Toni Togar.

Fadli's tasks are: (1) Conducts surveys (bank opening hours, bank closing hours, how many people are in the bank, assessing the opponent's power whether there is a weapon or not, escorted by police or no, what time is the usual car between money every morning. Survey conducted for two weeks); (2) Survey reports are reported to Indra Warman.

During the robbery execution, Fadli was not involved. One month later the perpetrators were caught. The robbery went successful. The results obtained from Lippo Bank's robbery amounted to approximately 130 million Rupiahs. The news became excited because Indra Warman / Toni Togar is a member of Jamaah Islamiyah. Of the 130 million Rupiahs earned, Fadli got 2.8 million rupiahs shares in aid. The proportion of the division is 20 percent for the people involved in the robbery, the remaining 80 percent is for infaq. After being tracked after the arrest, 80 percent went to Noordin M.Top to support the 2003 J.W. Marriott Hotel Jakarta bombing in 2003.

Fadli distributed money from the robbery to send via cash deposit at the bank, because at that time there was no e-banking. Fadli's understanding of religion at that time was still not deep. At that time he was 20 years old. So there is curiosity. By the time Fadli was in jail, he thought, if only to make money, do not bother to rob.

During the Tanjung Gusta LP in 2003 to 2007, Fadli made friends with the Acehese. Being friends, he learned the language of Aceh. After one year of studying the Aceh language, he is fluent in Aceh. Fadli builds relationships with former inmates of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) and narcotics prisoners who are also Acehese. The Aceh Network in Tanjung Gusta Penitentiary is led by a man named Ardian, he is a former GAM member. His profession is a pirate. The groups in Tanjung Gusta Penitentiary consist of: (1) Firearms Mafia and (2) Narcotic Mafia.

One time, Toni Togar once said that the money / fai search was done to: (1) Help the weaker brothers, (2) Buy weapons for jihad preparation. This means when there is a riot or the right moment, then the weapon can be used. Fadli saw there was an opportunity and potential for action in the field of jihad. After Fadli was accepted into the Aceh community, he learned how to do business in narcotics and firearms. He wants to know things: (1) How they smuggle firearms; (2) Where they got firearms; (3) The Source of funding from where.

At that time there were a total of 2500 inmates. Almost half are Acehese. Fadli sees Aceh as described by The First President of Indonesia, President Soekarno once, has a shoulder-to-shoulder character and help inherent in Acehese people.

"In the prison that happens synergy and fusion (merging) between drug networks, firearms networks and radical networks. Fadli learned a lot from the Acehese group on smuggling. In his mind, not only drugs or weapons, but also other illegal goods can be smuggled into Indonesia. "

Fadli gained confidence while in prison. Once out of prison, Fadli and the Acehese group are still building relationships, because inside the prison, they are like family. Fadli's colleagues from Aceh said that he went home, went back to Aceh and became an Acehese. Fadli sees them as having the potential of the Aceh group: (1) Breaking away from the Unitary State of

the Republic of Indonesia; (2) Adhering to Islamic Shari'a, although not yet radical but can be directed toward radical.

Fadli noticed that Acehese groups share the same vision with him despite the different goals. The Acehese group aims to become separatists, Fadli aims at jihad ideology. He thinks he can take advantage of the condition by going into the Aceh network. That is what changed the conditions that initially joined in and became criminals. Apart from Fadli's high curiosity. During his time in prison, Fadli attended lectures performed by Ustad Toni Togar. The study was also attended by Acehese groups. Fadli and Acehese groups share their knowledge and experiences. Fadli became aware of smuggling of narcotics and weapons, while the Acehese group became the ideology of jihad. Previously the Acehese group had understood the ideology of jihad, but only the scope of Aceh (local). In the study it was explained by Ustad Toni Togar that jihad is not only in Aceh, and how the world is subject to Islam. Since then the relationship between Fadli and the Acehese became increasingly familiar.

In addition to the existing jihad terminology in prison, other things that corroborate radicalization within the prison are the pressures in prison that are not physical. For example the rules. Sometimes when the time of prayer, the mosque closes. The next thing is related tied, food is limited. These things make the inmates angry. In addition, clean water / dead water facilities. When certain hours of water die. If given the comfort and rights of prisoners, then they will not think to rebel. There are basic rights of inmates who are not fulfilled making them radical. There is dissatisfaction and disappointment of the prisoners, gathered and when given a radical understanding, they will more easily join the radical group. A gathering of disappointment, combined with ideology, makes the inadvertents radicalized spontaneously. The similarity of feelings and disappointments is reinforced by the ideology of catalyzing radicalization in prison. Related to smuggling activities of narcotics and firearms, Fadli is more logical, and is motivated to earn money in a quick and easy way.

After the prison, Fadli met friends while in prison. The meeting was held in Aceh based on the address given to Fadli during my time in prison. He traveled to several places in Aceh, East Aceh (Perlak), North Aceh (Nisam, Jenib), Sigli, Banda Aceh. Fadli wants to strengthen the relationships that have been built inside the prison. In 2007, Fadli was in Aceh for a month, then go home to Pekanbaru. Fadli did not have a job at that time. Having the phone number he had saved, Fadli contacted the Acehese group. He was given the Mobile Number of a group of Aceh friends who had been a Malaysian. His name is Tarmizi Taher. The Aceh group infects Fadli if there is no work, he can travel to Malaysia to get a job in Malaysia. Tarmizi Taher operates Narcotics network in Malaysia and Indonesia. The types of narcotics that are traded are methamphetamine and ecstasy.

The practice of narcotics smuggling with Malaysia-Indonesia routes can be safe because of the cargo involved in the company. Cargo personnel are approached by narcotics kingpin to be conditioned. In Malaysia, drugs are actually transit. The ultimate goal is actually Indonesia. Narcotics from Malaysia are sent through two methods: (1) Air lines: at certain airports (Penang Airport to Medan airport). (2) Sea line: from Port Klang (Malaysia) to Tanjung Balai Asahan (Indonesia) and PortKlang (Malaysia) to Dumai (Indonesia) then proceed to Pekanbaru (Indonesia). The technique that Fadli did by working with the ferry captain. The compensation given was amounts of money.

Another viable route to smuggling narcotics and firearms is the path of illegal Indonesian labor migrants. Route: Johor Bahru (Malaysia) to Batam (Indonesia) and vice versa. This route is taken for one hour. Every night hundreds of illegal migrant workers passing by. Until now the activity is still ongoing. Every night at least 5 boats cross from Malaysia to Indonesia. The time starts from 1 AM, arrived in Batam at 2 AM. Port in Batam is located in Tanjung Ugang

Fadli left for Malaysia from Asahan to Port Klang. Arriving at Port Klang he was picked up, staying at Condominium Setapak Kuala Lumpur. The Malaysia drug network is not involved in terrorist activities. The leader of the Aceh narcotics network in Malaysia named Yusri, originally from Samalanga Aceh Utara, Indonesia. Tarmizi is a believer of Yusri. While in Malaysia, Fadli was given a laptop used to make financial bookkeeping. "Fadli thinks to do business on narcotics and firearms with logical reasoning, not to ideological, because ideologically not justified like that."

According to Fadli (2018), smuggling of narcotics and firearms could occur on the cooperation of transnational crime groups. In 2008, Fadli trafficked the methamphetamine three times. Each of 1 kilogram with a total of 3 kilograms of methamphetamine. The route: PortKlang-Asahan. The network system is a closed system. Fadli departs from PortKlang to Asahan. In Tanjung Balai Asahan, he was picked up by someone he did not know. Smuggling activities can be safe because there is cooperation in the port, both in PortKlang and Asahan. It was the safest route back then and was the official route. Unofficial routes are made through timber boats, also through Illegal TKIs with Johir Bahru-Batam route.

After Fadli arrived in Asahan, drugs were not handed over physically. He reported to the Narcotics group in Kuala Lumpur that he had arrived at Asahan. Arriving at Tanjung Balai Asahan, Fadli was directed to put the goods: (1) Put in front of the mosque; (2). Placed at the front of the hotel, after it was taken by someone. Fadli's role only leads and there are tasks and parts of each. The knowledge Fadli gained from the Malaysian network: (1) Narcotics concealment in the car, through the cavities in the car; (2) Narcotics concealment in plastic packaging, (3) Narcotics concealment in a juice blender, (4) Narcotics concealment in cavities on spare tires in car, (5) Laying tiger skin for fearful dogs.

Fadli (2018) reveals the key to smuggling success is teamwork, there must be people at certain posts doing their respective duties. After that Fadli began to enter in the material narcotrerme. Salaries from Fadli working in the drug network he used to buy weapons. He bought in Thailand through the Acehnese network. If there is drug activity usually associated also with the arms trade. There is a legal loophole in Malaysia that is used, provided that it is not placed on the body, by paying a lawyer, usually the perpetrator will be separated from the law. For 6 months he worked in Malaysia, he got about 150 million rupiah. Payroll system is not a monthly salary, but the commission after success transaction. Fadli only bought two shoots for 15 million rupiah, the rest he gave to friends who need help.

Fadli purchased weapons from the Tarmizi M. Taher network that had access to members of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in southern Thailand named Muhtar. By Tarmizi, Fadli was introduced to Muhtar. On the border of Southern Thailand there are several provinces: Naratiwan, Iyala, Pattani. Fadli uses Naratiwan province. He paid firearms in cash by giving money to Muhtar. The border condition between Thailand and Malaysia is bounded by rivers. Smuggling activities are done through the river. To avoid the suspicion of officers at the border, Fadli wore clothes by adjusting the community around the border. Port engineering performed: clothing, language. The crucial point is language mastery. Assimilation and trust from the criminal networks begins from mastering their language. After Fadli gave her the money, she waited across the river. Cover story of the invasion is done by: (1) Hidden under the fruit basket. Officers do not check the delivery of goods through the river because the volume of movement of goods is quite high. Other coverstory done is (2) Stored under a bird cage. The weapon that Fadli bought was FN and Colt. From Malaysia he brought to Indonesia using the official route using the ferry: PortKlang Malaysia - Tanjung Balai Asahan Indonesia. Before the ferry boat docked to the official port, Fadli boarded a wooden boat, then picked up in the middle

of the sea using a wooden boat. The journey lasted for five hours, while Fadli hid about half an hour in the engine room.

The weapon that Fadli had smuggled into Indonesia, he handed over to Safrizal, a former Acehese drug prisoner at end of 2008. In 2009 Fadli was arrested on charges of firearms ownership. Safrizal was arrested for robbing at BRI Aceh using the weapon. In 2009 Fadli was arrested by the Police and received a sentence of one year in prison. The verdict runs from 2009 until 2010. Exit me from prison in 2010. Out of prison, students assisted by Ustad Toni were asked to face Fadli for knowledge of engineering techniques.

The triggering factor of terrorism starts from the economic problem corroborated with ideology. Another case in the penitentiary was initially triggered by the problem of disappointment reinforced by the ideology. The dominant factor that influences is the economic factor. Economic factors lingered in livelihood issues. The majority of CIMB Niaga's perpetrators were thugs, while Acehese who took part in the CIMB robbery were more because of the escape of terrorist military training in the Jantho Mountains of Aceh. Fadli am not a CIMB Niaga field practitioner, only as an ideology / suggestor. For the sake of security factor, Fadli make communication system disconnected. Fadli does not know the perpetrators of his field, he just tells the technique works only.

The ideology of radicalization carried out comes from the indoctrination done by Toni Togar, that his treasure is the treasure of Fa'i or Fa'i concept with the amaliyah working system. In committing the robbery, Fadli suggested to the perpetrators of CIMB Niaga's robbery to act like everyday, to avoid the suspicion of the community. The ideology of Toni Togar: the treasure is the treasure of fa'i and aims to help the Muslims. The reality on the ground is not so. He thinks logically. So the funds will be used for the movement of terrorism. Buy weapons, to help the troubled Muslim brothers.

From the CIMB Niaga robbery of 363 million rupiahs, Fadli was given 10 million rupiahs for the private. After the CIMB Niaga robbery event, Taufik asked Fadli to buy two new weapons of a kind of pistol. He asked for 25 million rupiahs to buy the weapon. Fadli then went to Thailand to meet Mukhtar with a cover story of a bird cage. Fadli was arrested in Malaysia in 2010 for a report from Indonesia on the case of CIMB Niaga. The technique of catching originated from Fadli Mobile number tracking in Malaysia. When arrested in Malaysia, Fadli took 2 colt revolver weapons. In Malaysia Sy was arrested on the basis of the Internal Security Act (ISA). Arrested by Malaysian authorities in October 2010, Fadli was deported in December 2010. The proceedings sentenced Fadli to 11 years in prison.

In July, the year 2013 occurred riot in Tanjung Gusta Penitentiary. The incident caused the death of water and electricity for two days and two nights. The Correctional Officer does not immediately respond, especially when it is the month of fasting. Narcotic prisoners are very disappointed. Fadli saw the situation possible to escape from the penitentiary, He fled to Malaysia through the illegal path from Asahan aboard a fishing boat to the port of Klang. He moved from Tanjung Balai Asahan at two o'clock in the morning. He was taken to the middle of the sea, then moved to the Malayisa fishing boat. Soon Fadli arrived at Port Klang. In the Kuala Lumpur Fadli was arrested by Malaysian police. In November 2013 Fadli was arrested, then detained in Mobile Brigade Headquarters for 7 months. Then transferred to Salemba, then Sentul.

Imprisonment history Fadli Sadama:

**Table 1.** Interview with Fadli Sadama (2018)

| <b>Year</b>                   | <b>Description</b>                         |
|-------------------------------|--|
| 2003-2007                     | Class I Penitentiary Medan (Tanjung Gusta) |
| May 2009 - June 2010          | Detention House Class II B Bireuen, Aceh   |
| December 2010 - July 2013     | Class I Penitentiary Medan (Tanjung Gusta) |
| July 2013 - November 2013     | Escape to Malaysia                         |
| December 2013 - November 2017 | Salemba Penitentiary                       |
| November 2017 - March 2018    | Sentul Penitentiary                        |

According to Sadama (2018), the relationship between the crime of smuggling of narcotics and terrorism is: the outcome of a bank robbery is partially allocated for weapons purchases, partly used to support the bombing of the JW Marriot Hotel in 2003. Neither did the proceeds work in the drug network to buy weapons. Then weapons are used for jihad preparation. Facts on the ground, his weapon was used by Syafrizal to rob Bank BRI Bireun in 2009. The weapon was purchased from Fadli's work on the Aceh drug network in Malaysia. Fadli's role in CIMB Niaga Medan robbery as a weapon owner and not robbery. Fadli did not join rob in 2013

Fadli Sadama is an Adviser to the Indonesian Mujahidin Group (KMI) affiliated with the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) terror organization. Toni Togar, Chairman of KMI is one of the leaders of Jamaah Islamiyah (IPAC, 2015) who acts as an intellectual robbery actor. Based on data obtained from the Medan High Court Verdict Number: 550 / PID / 2011 / PT-MDN 2011, Fadli has an advisory position Indonesian Mujahidin Group (KMI).

The organizational structure of KMI according to the following table:

**Table 2.** The organizational structure of KMI

| No | Title                      | Name  |
|----|----------------------------|---|
| 1  | Amir (Chairman)            | Indra Warman aka Toni Togar alias Abang     |
| 2  | Treasurer                  | Fadli Sadama                                |
| 3  | Advisor                    | Ridwan Cina aka Rizki                       |
| 4  | Aceh Group                 | Ardiyan, , Manyak, Zainal, Halim            |
| 5  | Riau Group                 | Hasby, Flury, Mas Karyo                     |
| 6  | Medan Group, divided into: |   |
|    | Hampanan Perak Group       | Marwan aka Nanang aka WakGeng               |
|    | Binjai Group               | Yono, Abdi                                  |
|    | Belawan Group              | Asep, Taufik Hidayat aka taufik alias Abang |
|    | Group titi Kuning          | Rahmad, Aryo                                |
|    | Tanjung Balai Group        | Bima, Ghazali                               |

Source: Medan High Court Verdict Number: 550 / PID / 2011 / PT-MDN (2011)

Situational analysis and risk assessment of smuggling patterns and weaknesses of border control have been successfully studied and manifested by Fadli Sadama and resulted in successful run-of-the-mill smuggling operations. Geographical proximity between Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand provides the economic benefits of cost reduction by Fadli Sadama in

committing his crimes. Language equality, sociocultural (Malay), and support from illegal migration of Labor among nations became a strategic support for Fadli Sadama's efforts in supporting smuggling of narcotics. Social closeness with the Acehese group is also another supporting factor in supporting Fadli Sadama's illegal activities.

#### 4 Conclusion

Based on the above article, the authors conclude several things as follows:

- 1) Economic factors are the main factors causing narcotism in Indonesia
- 2) There is a symbiotic mutualism between narcotics trade, firearms trade, and terrorist activity in Indonesia
- 3) Strategically, there is a chronic vulnerability in the border area between Indonesia and Malaysia, especially along the Malacca Strait. Suggestions that writers can propose is to increase supervision at the points prone to smuggling firearms and narcotics by conducting hot spot policing
- 4) Handling of transnational crime cases requires cross-country cooperation and cross-law enforcement and fellow national security actors.
- 5) Implementation of security sector reform and rule of law becomes an absolute matter in order to realize security in national and regional scope

#### Acknowledgement

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Indexed International Publication For The Final Assignment Grant (Hibah PITTA)

#### References

- [1] Björnehed, E. (2004). Narco-terrorism: The merger of the war on drugs and the war on terror. *Global Crime*, 6(3-4), 305-324
- [2] Brantingham & Brantingham (1993) Environment, Routine, and Situation: Toward a Pattern Theory of Crime. In : Clarke,R & Felson,M. (eds). *Routine Activity and Rational Choice. Advanced in Criminological theory. Volume 5.* New Brunswick, New Jersey, Transaction Publisher. Pp. 259-294
- [3] Cohen, L.E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review* 44:588-605
- [4] Cornish D & Clark, R. (1986). *The Reasoning Criminal: Rational choice Perspectives on Offending.* New York: Springer-Verlag
- [5] Cribb, R. and Ford, M. (2009), 'Indonesia as an archipelago: Managing islands, managing the seas', in R. Cribb and M. Ford, eds., *Indonesia beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State.* Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp 1-27
- [6] Ehrenfeld,R. (1990). *Narcoterrorism.* New York: Basic Books
- [7] Felson, M. (1987) . Routine activities and crime prevention in the developing metropolis. *Criminology* 25:911-31
- [8] Findlay, Mark. (2003). *The globalization of Crime: Understanding Transnational Relationship in Context.* Cambridge University Press,
- [9] Hugo, G. (1993), 'Indonesian Labour Migration to Malaysia: Trends and Policy Implications,' *Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 21, no. 1, pp. 36-70

- [10] Hunter, C. (2006). 'People in Between', Inside Indonesia, No. 88 (October-December). Available at <http://www.insideindonesia.org/edition-49/49-special-issue-on-sumatra>.
- [11] Institute For policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC). (2015). Support For Islamic State in Indonesian Prisons. IPAC Report no.15. pp.11
- [12] International Crisis Group (ICG). (2010). 'Illicit arms in Indonesia'. Asia Briefing No. 109, 6 September. Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group
- [13] Keel,R.O. (1997). Rational Choice and Deterrence Theory. [Online] Available: <http://www.umsl.edu/~rkeel/200/ratchoc.html>
- [14] Martin, J. M. and Romano, A. T. (1992) Multinational Crime-Terrorism, Espionage, Drug & Arms Trafficking. SAGE Publications
- [15] Medan High Court Verdict Number: 550 / PID / 2011 / PT-MDN (2011)
- [16] Mueller, G. (1998)., Transnational Crime: Definitions and Concepts, Transnational Organized Crime 4, no. (n.d.)
- [17] Paternoster R, Bancman R. (2001). Explaining Criminals and Crime. Los Angeles, California: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- [18] Ramelan, Prayitno. (2017). *Ancaman Virus Terorisme*. Jakarta: Grasindo.
- [19] Sadama, Fadli. 2018. Depth interview with Fadli Sadama in Medan, Indonesia on June,12 2018
- [20] Sumaryono, D. (2009). 'The Indonesian maritime security coordinating board', in R. Cribb and M. Ford, eds., Indonesia Beyond the Water's Edge: Managing an Archipelagic State. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 134-145

