

# The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria & the Worldwide Web: A Threat to the National Security of Indonesia

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**Abstract.** In this modern-day and age, the internet has become almost inseparable with daily lives. People interact with other people in social media just like in the real world. However, that also comes with the real-life dangers coming into and from the cyber world. Terrorist groups are now using social media to advance their agenda. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) utilizes mainstream social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter to radicalize and recruit. Indonesians, as one of their targets, are highly susceptible to this tactic. This phenomenon influence people to act as a lone-wolf, join ISIS paramilitary groups, or become Foreign Terrorist Fighter. Using the qualitative method, data are collected through interviews and literature studies from books and journals. This study aims to provide detailed information on ISIS's social media activity through various cases, and the national security threats following ISIS's presence on social media.

**Keywords:** Social Media, ISIS, National Security, Terrorism

## 1 Introduction

The rapid growth of technology adds value to the lives it touches in unique ways. Vast amount of information is stored and accessible very easily. Information is provided for everyone, but as accessible as researchers and students to find information, it is also easy for terrorists to find information regarding their targets and weapons of choice. ISIS has proven to be amongst the first to use terrorism tactics through internet utilization. After claiming itself Islamic State in 2014, their ideology prompted all Muslim to recognize Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a caliph or a leader of all Muslims [1]. ISIS persuades Muslims all over the world to come to Syria and Iraq to fight alongside them, and when they go back to their countries of origin, they bear the burden of sharing the propaganda and/or take actions to further their agenda.

ISIS in their headquarters, Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, interacts with its sympathizers all over the world through long-distance communication. Social media plays a vital part in this interaction [2]. Potential Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF)s are guided online through chat rooms. Individuals or lone-wolf terrorists are encouraged to carry out jihad by ISIS members they have encountered on social media. Internet and social media eases the process of transferring information, people, and resources. One of the latest examples of its media propaganda's successful result is the Indonesians that sought to go home after being 'lied' to by ISIS. This social media tactic has shown to be fruitful.

Nur and Leefa, both housewives, took their husbands, relatives, and children to travel to Raqqa, Syria. Their motive is to live as a pure Muslim under the leadership of daulah Islamiyah

(Islamic state). Nur migrated to Syria after watching videos and looking at uploaded photos by ISIS on the internet, meanwhile, Leefa was contacted by an ISIS member through the internet that claims they will reimburse her family's plane ticket. They were promised free healthcare, job opportunities, cheaper living cost, overall an image of a prosperous life [3].

Arriving there, Nur's father and male relatives were coerced into fighting in the war. Many ISIS fighters sought to marry Nur, she said that they were very thirsty for women. On the other hand, Leefa has a sickness that will cost very high if treated in Indonesia. The ISIS member said medical care is free of any expenses in Raqqa. It turned out, medical care there costs very high and she did not get proper treatment. They ended up in a refugee camp, approximately 60 km north of Raqqa, and were deported in June 2017 [3].

The Head of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism or Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT), Suhardi Alius acknowledges ISIS' propaganda through the internet and social media and persuaded Indonesians to stop believing in ISIS' propaganda. He gave a case example of a truck driver from Malang, East Java, that ISIS promised to give the position as a battle tank driver. Once he arrived there, it never happened. Suhardi wants Indonesians to realize that ISIS is only taking advantage of them through empty promises of prosperous life [4]. This study aims to provide detailed information on ISIS's social media activity from various cases, and the national security threats following the implication of ISIS' presence on social media.

## 2 Method

The research approach or method that the researcher used is qualitative. Qualitative method is the most suitable method as the researcher aims to explore a social context or phenomenon rather than confirming hypotheses. The researcher gathered data through field research and literature studies, in which the researcher collected primary data in the forms of direct interviews or discussion. Interviews are conducted with the International Crime Division staff member of NCB-INTERPOL Indonesia, a member of the Indonesia Police Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Keamanan Polri, Baintelkam), and Al-Chaidar writer of *Pengantar Pemikiran Politik Proklamator Negara Islam Indonesia S.M. Kartosoewirjo* and the Head of Anthropology Department of Malikussaleh University.

The researcher gathered secondary and tertiary data from books, journals, documents from trusted sources. For books, the researcher took references from *Lone-wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat* by Jeffrey D. Simon. Notable journals such as *Islamic State: The Changing Face of Modern Jihadism* by Erin Marie Saltman and Charlie Winter, *The Islamic State's Use of Social Media* by Lisa Blaker, and *Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq* by Jytte Klausen. These resources are to confirm and add to the explanations and case studies provided by informants mentioned.

The researcher analyzes data using field examples taken from media and case studies in articles and books mentioned. First, the researcher examines ISIS' general activities on the internet and its internal structure that was formed to fulfill this specific task. Based on the examination, the researcher determines which social media platforms involved in the act and accumulate facts from interview, media, and research articles to know how each of those platforms are used by ISIS for their agenda. The researcher studied the definition and depths of national security in Indonesia, along with ISIS's forms of threat from its social media activity, and analyzes whether ISIS's social media activity is a threat to Indonesia's national security.

### 3 ISIS and the World Wide Web


The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria owns media production companies, the al-Furqan Institute for Media Production and the al-Hayat Media Center. Al-Furqan mainly produces CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related propaganda products. Al-Hayat Media Center targets the Western audiences. It produces the online magazine Dabiq in English, and many other languages including German, Russian, French, and Bahasa language [5].

The media produced by al-Furqan is targeted to incite threat and intimidation [6]. For example, the grisly beheading videos of James Foley and Steven Sotloff, both American journalists, also David Haines and Alan Henning, both British humanitarian aid workers, were produced by al-Furqan. All of those videos contained a narrative that shows ISIS' actions as 'punishment' towards the parties that are hostile to them.

On the other hand, al-Hayat Media Center is responsible for recruiting. It does its work through the Internet, from social media platforms [6]. Dabiq digital magazine reaches a wider audience because it was written in English and other languages [5]. There is also Indonesian language version of Dabiq, translated by Katibah Nusantara, a Southeast Asian ISIS counterpart in Syria. A media reported that the late Ganna Pryadharizal, a man from Jakarta who took his family to Syria in October 2015, was tasked to translate Dabiq and news from Amaq News Agency, an official ISIS propaganda news media [7].



Fig. 1. The first and second issue of Dabiq digital magazine in English [8]



**Fig. 2.** The first and second issue of Dabiq in Bahasa Indonesia [8]

The magazine comprises of ideology and propaganda, interviews with ISIS fighters, and transcript of ISIS leader’s speeches [8]. Contents of Dabiq magazine imbued with Salafi-Jihadism ideology, which is a puritanical movement aiming to revert Muslims to be adherent to the Koran (religious text of Islam) by living purely under Sharia law, thus rejecting any other ideology [9]. It convinces its audience through persuasion based on theological references from the Koran. The overall theme of Dabiq magazine is that Islamic State is an “all-embracing Islamic territory” that dictates its people through the ways of the Koran.

Lisa Blaker, in her study *The Islamic State’s Use of Social Media*, claims that ISIS recruiting campaign targets the millennial generation, especially from the U.S., U.K., and Australia [2]. According to the Pew Research Center, millennials are those who born between 1981-1996 [10]. According to a 2018 survey by APJII (Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa Internet Indonesia or Association of Internet Service Provider Indonesia), the majority of 22-37 years old in Indonesia use the internet. Most of them use the internet for social networking through chat-based social media platforms [11]. Therefore, Indonesians are vulnerable to ISIS internet propaganda, as confirmed by the Indonesian National Police (INP) Chief Tito Karnavian, who acknowledges the danger of radicalism through the internet [4].

### **3.1. Social Media Content of the Most Notorious Terrorist Group**

ISIS in its glory days had a territory as big as Britain, with ten to twelve million people under its control in 2014, according to *The Independent*. It had approximately 200,000 jihadists from five continents and sophisticated social media campaigns available in various languages designed to attract the millennial generation [12]. The group utilizes numerous social media channels to spread their propaganda. Social media outlets they are using are including, but not limited to: Twitter, BlackBerry Messenger, Facebook, WhatsApp, Telegram, and Instagram. Each has relatively significantly different content than the other.


**Twitter.** According to Tampa Bay Times, in 2014 there were as many as 200,000 pro-ISIS tweets, Facebook updates, or other social media posts a day. That year, there were 45,000 pro-ISIS accounts made on Twitter [13]. Jytte Klausen, who studies ISIS on Twitter, pointed out that ISIS interacts with their ‘followers’ by posting propaganda pictures and teachings through Twitter, as an easy to use and inexpensive platform. They recruit masses and tell them how to get to Syria to join the headquarters. ISIS also shows them how to make homemade bombs if they cannot travel, to be used against those whom ISIS thinks is hindering the purpose of building a caliphate [14].

Twitter gives an illusion or emergence in its nature, however, Klausen found out that the tweets have certain patterns attached to it. ISIS does not only post gore and violence but interesting simple kinds of stuff, which in turn bring success to their recruitment campaign through social media. For example, they use pictures, such that captures “daily life of a fighter” or Syrian panoramic landscapes, which pull people into the group [14].

**BlackBerry Messenger.** BlackBerry Messenger (BBM) features ‘channel’, a method of connecting worldwide communities through one colossal chat room that specializes in a specific area of interest or topic where groups and individuals across nations can mingle and interact with each other. The members of the channel can view and comment under the content shared by the channel provider, or the user who establishes the channel.

In the ISIS case, ISIS or pro-ISIS supporters establish channels and set the topic about daulah or khilafah (meaning ‘caliphate’ or ‘Islamic State’). Usually does not last long before those channels are terminated by BBM, but there are many of these channels recorded by iBRABO, an Open Source Intelligence research group located in Waterloo, Ontario and Manchester, U.K. Condon and Weyers, the team behind iBRABO, found over six channels linking to ISIS with the search term ‘Islamic State’ in 2015 [15].

Things get interesting when the iBRABO team found out that five out of six samples of these channels target Indonesia specifically. The channels use Bahasa Indonesia as the native language, obviously to lure Indonesians. BBM is very popular with Indonesian users that Indonesia’s President Joko Widodo said in 2016, “BlackBerry Messenger is 100% owned by Indonesia, it can be considered a social media platform by Indonesia.” [16].



**Fig. 3.** Samples of ISIS channels on BlackBerry Messenger [15]

**Facebook.** On Facebook, ISIS uses the platform to advertise and recruit. James Farwell mentioned in The Media Strategy of ISIS “Prospective recruits can use Facebook and other social media platforms to communicate with foreign fighters engaged in battle to learn what the experience is like, and to contact facilitators who can explain how to join the fight in Syria and Iraq.” [17] The iBRABO team also supports Farwell’s claim as in 2014, they found many ISIS Facebook recruiting pages in English, French, Danish, Spanish, Dutch, German, or Arabic (to name a few) [18].



Fig. 4. ISIS recruiting pages from left-to-right in: Danish, French, and Tagalog [18]



Fig. 5. Islamic State of Iraq and Sham Indonesia’s Facebook Group Header [18]

ISIS also extend their Facebook reach to focus on the audience from Indonesia or Southeast Asia at large, mainly Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines [19]. Condon and Weyers even claim that intelligence analysts regard Indonesia as the potential secondary target for ISIS



growth [20]. Its campaign on Facebook succeeded to gather thousands of people to openly declare their support for ISIS at Bundaran HI, Central Jakarta on March 16, 2014 [21].

**WhatsApp.** According to local terrorism analyst Al-Chaidar, ISIS also uses WhatsApp as a communication tool. However, they do not use it as the main tool to plan attacks and radicalize because they understand the consequence of using less encrypted platform to do serious tasks. WhatsApp is accessible by the government, police, and intelligence agencies to infiltrate to gather information according to the interviewee from INTERPOL. Therefore, it is only used by some of the ISIS lower ranks and sympathizers for connection with distant affiliates or supporters.

**Telegram.** Telegram is a highly encrypted chat-based social media platform. It features a 'secret chat' mode, colossal group chat, and channel feature. When something is encrypted, it means the data stored in that application is transformed into some sort of algorithm that is difficult for anyone without a pass to access [22]. The secret chat feature is highly popular as user can set the chat to self-destruct seconds or minutes after the receiver reads the chat. The colossal group chat is very much like the channel on BlackBerry Messenger, whilst the channel feature is a one-way information sharing. Usually, when a person discovers a channel through browsing a key term from the Telegram search tab, the channel then provides the person with information about its topic and gives out a link of related chat group the person may join for discussions.

It is very highly encrypted that terrorist groups are keen to use, but the police and the government struggled to intercept if they would like to gather information from the chat application. The government acted upon it and in 2017, Telegram co-founder, Pavel Durov, agreed with Indonesia's Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (KOMINFO) to remove illegal terrorist content from the platform and decrypt suspicious chats [23]. Telegram user's personal information is also encrypted and anyone may fake his or her names and information on it. Therefore, ISIS and its supporters utilize Telegram to stay under the radar of the police and intelligence agencies.

According to a source from INTERPOL, lone-wolf terrorists, FTF, and pre-existing terrorist groups alike use Telegram to get in touch with other pro-ISIS supporters or official ISIS members in Syria and Iraq. For lone-wolf terrorists and FTF, usually, first, they get to know the propaganda through Telegram, joining the colossal group chats where anyone can share website links about how to make bombs and about the ISIS caliphate propaganda. For FTF, mainly ISIS conducts one-on-one chat with them to guide them to hijrah.

**Instagram.** Instagram has over 60 million users from Indonesia alone [24]. Instagram is owned by Facebook, but it is favored more by the youth and millennials than its parent company. ISIS tends to make themselves appeal to the youth and millennials because they are creative, able to fight, and easy to manipulate [2]. In this case, Instagram is a hotbed for recruitment tool.

Instagram is known for its pioneer of Story feature, whereas users can upload pictures or live videos to the Story, and it will disappear after 24 hours. ISIS uses the Story feature to recruit and educate people. Exploiting its nature of temporary posts, they promote their causes expecting to add more members to the group. Besides Story feature, Instagram's Direct Message (DM) feature, that lets users to easily delete or unsent messages after sending it, is utilized for the same agenda. ISIS-linked accounts usually post gruesome photos of beheadings and killings, and propaganda posts like photos of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and ISIS logo. Instagram claims they have been working to remove ISIS-linked content or account [25].

### **3.2. Purpose and Objective of Social Media Utilization**

With the ease of access and anonymity in Social Media, one can spread dangerous information and propaganda through fast and without any meaningful barrier. ISIS views this as a potential outlet for their propaganda. According to interviews and literature studies by various sources, they are utilizing at least six social media to spread their propaganda, recruiting, communicating, and to instigate an attack. The numbers of ISIS or affiliated accounts on social media platforms are increasing in numbers. Moreover, judging from multiple occasions of attacks, their social media campaign is considered as successful, which makes them feared and deemed as a threat.

**Radicalizing with Koran.** ISIS would take significant effort to encourage and spread Koran values, specifically on radical views of Khilafah and Jihadism. They publish Dabiq digital magazine, produced by ISIS media production companies, the al-Hayat Media Center. ISIS targets the millennial generation, using memes, photos, and quotes on Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram, opening chat groups on Telegram and Blackberry Messenger to ease users to learn more about the ideology.

Usually, this tactic is most effective to recruit lone-wolves. Lone-wolf is often self-radicalized through social media, they are individuals who decided to attack in the name of ISIS regardless of their affiliation to the group. The Indonesian government acknowledges the threat of online radicalization, therefore the cybercrime police have been assertive to apprehend hate speech post maker that can provoke and segregate the people, pushing them to radicalism.

In Indonesia, many have fallen prey to the propaganda, for example, the infamous self-proclaim ISIS 'bride' Dian Yulia Novi, a female self-radicalized suicide bomber who was arrested on December 10, 2016. She was self-radicalized online when working as a migrant worker in Taiwan, and recruited by the local paramilitary ISIS-pledged group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) network in Bekasi who tasked her to mount an attack at the Presidential Palace [26]. Also, an attack at Cikokol, South Tangerang, directed towards three police officers using knife and pipe bombs on October 20, 2016, killing an officer. Before the perpetrator stabbed three officers, he stamped an ISIS black flag sticker on the outer wall of the police post. Police spokesman said the perpetrator was an ISIS sympathizer learning their ideologies from the internet [27].

**Recruiting and Guiding to ISIS Headquarter.** The next step after radicalization, ISIS recruits prospective members and supporters with false promises of a prosperous life, so they may do hijrah (migration) to nearby ISIS compounds or contribute to the cause by attacking ISIS' enemies wherever they are. These members and sympathizers are recruited to recognize Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as caliph or ruler among all Muslim, it means thwarting their nation-states to be citizens of ISIS' caliphate. Those who do hijrah become FTF and those who cannot go are encouraged to mount an attack, lone-wolf style.

In 2016, ISIS released a video on YouTube featuring three men from the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The message in the video is focused on those who want to join ISIS. They are told that if they cannot travel to Syria, they can go to join Moro people in Mindanao, Southern Philippines. If they cannot travel at all, to take actions against non-believers and thoghut (authorities and/or other elements of the government) wherever they are [28].

It convinced families of Nur and Leefa who traveled to Syria in 2017. They were in contact with ISIS member who recruited them online, that taught them a systematic way to avoid government suspicion and join them in Syria. He lured them with a narrative of "pure Muslim



lifestyle” under ISIS’ territory, alongside cheap medical and living costs. Arriving there, Nur’s father and male relatives were forced into being FTF in the war. Meanwhile, Nur had to endure many sexually frustrated ISIS combatants who sought to marry her. ISIS also does not cover living costs and medical expenses that were very high. In the end, the families were stranded in refugee camps waiting for the Indonesian government to deport them [3].

**Making plans to attack.** Attack planning including telling how to kill with simple equipment (kitchen knife and sharp garden tools) produce homemade bombs, and strategic discussion including setting the location and targets, coordinating the events of the attack and the attacker’s actions before, on, and after the attack. For example, the Thamrin 2016 attacks where five people were killed on Central Jakarta was orchestrated by Bahrin Naim in Syria via Telegram [30]. The Police claimed that the attackers are part of Jemaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), a splinter cell of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) who pledged allegiance to ISIS. Bahrin Naim had been imprisoned in 2010 after police raided his compound in Bekasi on finding out he is associated with JAD. He was imprisoned for 2.5 years, during that period he radicalized fellow inmates to join Islamic extremist groups [29].

After his release in 2012, he was missing for a while before the police picked his track in Syria. From there, he recruited high school friends, Ibad and Arif Hidayatullah. Ibad and Arif were both members of Naim’s exclusive Telegram group called “Explosive and Electrochemistry Division“, they were imprisoned in 2016 for their attempts to attack the police, Buddhist temple, churches, and the former Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama. From Syria, Naim financed the group and taught to make explosives. Other recruits, Nur Solihin, Agus Supriyadi, Dina Yulia Novi, and Abu Izzah from JAD network in Bekasi, Jakarta, Solo, and Bandung whom the police have imprisoned in 2016 for bomb possession and attack attempts to police and government buildings, are all part of Telegram group established by Naim [30].

**Connecting with pre-existent groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIS.** ISIS uses the prominent feature of social media to maintain the connection with pre-existing groups that have sworn allegiance to ISIS. Pre-existing Islamic terrorist groups are classified as ISIS’ sympathizers if they have sworn allegiance to ISIS by acknowledging Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a caliph and rebrand their logo with the signature black flag. ISIS views itself as a state; it aims to establish one centralized Islamic state on Earth, starting from Iraq and Syria. Therefore, these pledges are advocates, regardless of their location, which is no less of a threat than ISIS members in its headquarters.

ISIS sympathizers in Indonesia that are unable to travel to Syria to join the nearest ISIS paramilitary or pre-existing supporter groups are encouraged to join the nearest pledged group [28]. JAD the most popular destination for these sympathizers, since central ISIS, acknowledged JAD attacks as being one of theirs. JAD’s networks extend to regions dominantly in Java and Sumatra. Besides JAD, there are Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) that is hunted down by the police in Central Sulawesi under Operation Tinombala, and Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB).

**Connecting with returning ISIS FTF.** FTF returnees, those who go home from warzone to be integrated back to their society, often bring with them network and contacts they have gathered whilst in the warzone, as claimed by Daniel Byman [31]. They have learned the ways to communicate under the government’s radar while still active as a fighter, so they may use that and all their skills and abilities learned to stage future cooperation. The government and authorities of Indonesia, as Baintelkam staff claimed in a private interview, are very cautious

about ISIS FTF returnees from Syria. Their actions are highly monitored in case they are conducting something suspicious that may harm the civilians or authorities.

Before 2019, the Indonesian police struggled to manage and monitor these FTF returnees, proven by the 2018 Surabaya Bombings incident that killed 15 churchgoers and 13 suicide bombers. Tito Karnavian, the Chief of Police, said that the suicide bombers consist of two families who have an affiliation to ISIS FTF. These families are involved in the Surabaya JAD network from which they are instructed by ISIS central to carry out the attack. The bomb used, nicknamed 'mother of satan' is popular among ISIS fighters [32]. There is no doubt that the instruction and bomb-making tutorial are communicated through Telegram.

In 2019, since the renewed Anti-terrorism Law has taken order, the police can arrest suspicious individuals, including FTF, before they act. Thus tables are turned, giving chance for the authorities to do preventive measures. The government has also tightened its FTF deportation policy by establishing a task force as liaison officers and quarantine FTF returnees before they are released back into society.

**Intimidating enemies.** Through ISIS videos, magazines, or pictures uploaded on social media, ISIS uses it effectively to intimidate opponents. Such as pictures of guns, a person's beheading remains, dead bodies, crucified men hanging on metal bars, and kids holding severed head uploaded to Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook may generate intimidation to ISIS enemies [14]. In July 2016, ISIS released a video declaring war against Indonesia and Malaysia. Some men and a bunch of kids that looked younger than 12, wielding AK assault rifles, dressed in camouflage uniform throwing away their passports, chanting "Allahu Akbar (God is the greatest)!", and being taught to shoot. One of the men said something in Malaysian language, explaining their origins and threatening his homeland [33]. In another video uploaded to YouTube, 8-year-old Indonesian kids are taught to shoot and attack with real weapons [34].

These are examples of intimidation, which ISIS uses to influence the people, police, and government in Indonesia and Malaysia. ISIS uses a dark theme of children exploitation to show viewers that they are universally accepted by teaching the younger generation to hate their countries and kill. They want governments to anticipate major ISIS attacks. They aim to instigate fear and panic in the minds of the viewers by posting it openly on social media platforms.

**Establishing Online Donation Campaign.** The head of Pusat Pelaporan dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan (Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, PPATK), Ki Agus Ahmad Badaruddin, discussed the most recent trend of terrorism financing in August 2019. He said terrorism financing method has evolved since 2015, they used to gain money through criminal means such as robbing and theft, now they open online donation campaign on social media and legal businesses, such as essential oil shop, phone credit, and electronic services. The donation campaigns are made as though it is to fund humanity activities, but after further investigation, it is to finance terrorism activities. Ki Agus persuaded the people to be more critical while donating on social media as to identify who is behind the campaign before donating. Dedi Prasetyo, the police spokesperson also said that the donation funds are spent to buy explosive materials and to fund the general operation of JI and JAD [35].

### **3.3. Threats of ISIS to the National Security of Indonesia**

Indonesia is home to the biggest Muslim population on the planet. Local ISIS sympathizers and affiliates despise Pancasila as the nation's ideology because it emphasizes unity in diversity,

which makes it impossible for Sharia law to be kaffah or applied wholly. Their point of view is that Pancasila was made by unbelievers for the interest of unbelievers, therefore corrupting the Muslim to not be able to be fully adherent to Sharia law. Pancasila and the law oppress the Muslim by making them comply with the ungodly nature, as in not Koranic based, according to Al-Chaidar. Law enforcement agencies, as in the police and the army, are seen as thoghut or satan. They receive many attacks because they are ISIS' main target besides the people, according to the interviewee from INTERPOL.

The government concerns the growing numbers of attacks and supporters in Indonesia that are directly affiliated or sympathized with ISIS. Due to this new trend, they renewed the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Law in 2018. It contains a new policy for the police to carry out preventive action on arresting terrorist suspects and acknowledges the transnational aspect of modern terrorism by adding verses against any parties involved in terrorist groups abroad since the previous one only covered the terrorist groups that are almost exclusively domestic. The 2018 Anti-Terrorism law mentioned that radicalism is a threat to the nation's ideology and security.

Therefore, ISIS radicalization campaign through social media is a threat to national security because it increases the potential threat from the already existing threat of actual ISIS affiliates, sympathizers and other existing domestic terrorist groups. Lack of knowledge and ease of accessibility to these propaganda and radicalization campaigns might greatly inspire and radicalize the Indonesian Islamic community. They are led to think that agreeing to Pancasila meaning that one is not a Muslim because true ummah follows only Sharia Law. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's message is clear in his sermons, "Oh soldiers of the Islamic State, erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Light the earth with fire against all dictators!" [36].

In propaganda videos in English and many different languages, the message is also the same; whether they travel to ISIS territories or attack wherever they are. They dare to thwart their own countries. Those who attack wherever they have become lone-wolf, those who join the nearest paramilitary or ISIS-pledged groups become recruits, and those who travel become FTF, as further described below:

**Lone-wolf.** Lone-wolf has played a significant role in the history of modern terrorism. "The biggest concern we have right now... is the lone-wolf terrorist," President Obama said in 2011. Lone-wolf is a big challenge to the security forces, mainly because of its unpredictable nature. Lone-wolf terrorism is hard to detect and prevent, as there is no organizational chain of command that the police can infiltrate [37].

The term "lone-wolf" according to Jeffrey D. Simon in his book *Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat* has no fixed definition thus it is up to debate and open-ended. However, according to Simon, lone-wolf terrorism possesses several characteristics. First, it is done by an individual, whether alone or with minimal support from acquaintances. Second, its purpose is to further "political, social, religious, financial, or other related goals" by inciting fear and terror that prompt the government or authorities to react. In conclusion, lone-wolf is a lone terrorist or a "leaderless resistance", who does his or her deeds not based on orders, but on choice made by conscience through adopted moral values to produce psychological or material casualties [37].

Since ISIS released a video that urges Southeast Asian viewers to kill the "enemy of Islam" anywhere, there are dozens of lone-wolf attacks all over Southeast Asian countries, especially in Indonesia. For example, the foiled attack on St. Joseph Church in Medan on August 28, 2016, which involved a 17-year-old ISIS sympathizer possessing a self-made bomb with writing "I love al-Baghdadi" was found in his bag [38]. Also, Mulyadi, an ISIS 'fanboy', who attacked two police officers near Falatehan Mosque, South Jakarta on July 2017. Mulyadi stated that he

aimed to kill thoghut or 'satan' in Arabic, as the way ISIS views the authorities. Both cases were investigated to be self-radicalized lone-wolves [38] [39].

**Recruits.** Lone-wolves aside, there are also recruits who either voluntarily joined or recruited by the paramilitary branch of ISIS or groups that pledged loyalties to ISIS. There are few examples of attacks that are done by recruits. Dian Yulia Novi is the most famous "bride" as she is the first female suicide bomber in Indonesia. At her interview behind bars with TIME Indonesia, she revealed that she was radicalized online, met friends with people like her on Facebook, chat with a JAD member on Telegram, and ultimately recruited to JAD. She was taught to make a pressure cooker bomb and told to detonate it at the presidential palace. The police anti-terror squad, Detachment 88, foiled her plan when they raided her residence at Bekasi in December 2016 [26]. Dian and many other ISIS sympathizers were targets to be recruited to nearest ISIS-pledged groups to bring about attacks and other ISIS agenda.

**Foreign Terrorist Fighter.** ISIS makes an effort on social media campaigns because it is effective to recruit Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF). FTF is designated as a threat to Indonesia's national security. According to the United Nations (UN), FTF is described as individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict. There are currently 30,000 of FTF fighting alongside ISIS in Syria and Iraq from over 100 countries [40]. FTF is useful because they possess the ability to translate and connect with a wider audience. They know about the latest trends in their countries and use it to pull people into joining them. They are also creative and resourceful in the content narrative, which brings success to ISIS social media campaign.

The dangers brought by FTF are that first, most of them are allowed to take control of ISIS' social media campaign. For example, Abu Sumayyah al-Britani who left his family in the U.K. for Syria in 2014, told the media, "It's actually quite fun. It's really really fun. It's better than that game Call of Duty. It's like that but it's in 3D where everything is happening in front of you." [14] They try to promote the lifestyle of jihadists in the war field to erase the audience's mindset that being involved in jihad will always be blood and war. They are luring people to come and join them, moreover, these FTF know the pathways to get into ISIS headquarters as they have gone into the same path. They also understand pop culture, such as posting cat pictures and referencing the game "Call of Duty" or "Halo" which are popular among teenagers [14].

Second, there is Katibah Nusantara, a Southeast Asian wing of ISIS which members are Indonesians and Malaysians or those speaking the Malayan language. Their purpose is to accommodate communication between ISIS and Southeast Asian jihadist groups who pledged their allegiance to ISIS. They translate ISIS' propaganda magazine into Bahasa Indonesia and Bahasa Melayu, they escort FTF from Indonesia and Malaysia, acting as a liaison officer. According to Al-Chaidar, they communicate via Telegram or other encrypted social media with Southeast Asian FTF and ISIS-pledged groups in the region. Those groups are including Abu Sayaff, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) who operates on eastern Indonesia (Sulawesi, Nusa Tenggara Islands, Maluku, and Papua), Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB) who operates on western Indonesia (Sumatra, Java, Borneo), and some other minor Islamic extremist groups in Indonesia, Philippines, and Malaysia [41]. With increasing FTF in Katibah Nusantara, ISIS's influence in Southeast Asia, channeled by ISIS-pledged groups are magnified.

Third, some FTF may return to their homelands bringing training and combat experience, contacts of ISIS network, and operational plan to carry out attacks. Once they made it home, they may join ISIS franchise near them and help radicalize others and plan an attack to carry out their purpose of establishing a caliphate in Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Philippines under the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

#### 4 Conclusion

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria or ISIS is a terrorist group operating in Syria and Iraq. They aim to build a caliphate on Syria and Iraq so their caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, can be the ruler of all Muslims. They use social media platforms as a tool for its global radicalism campaign tactic. ISIS is actively occupying the internet via social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and chat-based social media platforms such as Telegram, WhatsApp, and BlackBerry. Their purposes and objectives for social media activity are to radicalize with Koran, recruit, guiding to go to Syria and Iraq, make plans to attack, connect with pre-existing local or regional jihadi groups, connect with returning FTF, intimidate enemies, and funding.

ISIS' campaign through social media is a threat to Indonesia's national security due to its potential to increase more threats from the already existing terrorism threats. While as per the 2002 Eradication of Terrorism Criminal Act already defined terrorism as a threat, the trends of social media radicalization campaign increases the potential of it, thus demanding the government to update the Act in 2018. The threats posed by this social media campaign might create new ISIS affiliates or sympathizers in Indonesia in the form of a lone-wolf, recruits, or even Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF). ISIS-claimed terror attacks that have caused loss of life and/or damages to public facilities have proven that the threat of ISIS's social media campaign is not just a latent one.

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