Women and Politics of Moral and Islamic Populism In West Sumatra: Exclusionism And Uniformity

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Abstract. The revitalization of local custom and decentralization are the entrances to the strengthening of populism. Decentralization has brought changes in social and political boundaries in West Sumatra. This paper uses a qualitative method by conducting in-depth interviews, observations and collecting the documentation. Decentralization provides opportunities for regions to implement regional regulations with sharia nuances. Meanwhile, conservative Islamic groups in West Sumatra encourage politicians to promote morality in the public sphere. Support from local politicians is a logical consequence of the strength of Islam in West Sumatra. In the end, decentralization became a stimulus for the strengthening of Islamic Populism in West Sumatra. Supported by politicians and clerics, the local government implemented local regulations relating to political morality. From a populist perspective, moral politics is needed to distinguish between good and evil, and then in West Sumatra, exclusionism is carried out to exclude groups. Exclusionism is an attempt to differentiate and, at the same time, purify, which according to Taggart (2000), is an attempt to construct an identity as an awareness of who is not part of us rather than who we are. Through the Local Regulation nuanced Sharia in West Sumatra, Moral politics provides an opportunity to exclude groups considered morally different. It is not only women who are vulnerable to the excesses of exclusion but also minority groups such as LGBT and non-Muslims.

Keywords: Exclusionism, Islamic Populism, Politics of Moral, West Sumatra

1 Introduction

After the reformation, two power majors emerged in Indonesia: The Islamic and Democratization movements (Brenner: 2011). The second force is a mutually tangent that affects the lives of social politicians in Indonesia. One of the reforms is their demands to give the room more substantial to the region's strength, which is manifested in decentralization. During the Suharto centralization, so noticeably, that make the area should refer entirely to the government nationwide, ranging from the portion of the distribution of national revenue, the appointment of the head of the region and the disappearance of the diversity of governance areas (e.g., a village in West Sumatra).

Along with reforms demanded, the spirit of decentralization spawned regulatory regions is considered according to its situation and people. To reduce the turmoil of regional dissatisfaction with the centre, the Habibie Government made political efforts through one of them by issuing a law on Regional Autonomy Law No. .22/1999 and Law on Fiscal Balance

between the centre and the Regions No. 25/1999. This law changes the policy of centralized power to decentralized, where regions have the authority to more freely regulate finances, potentials and regional regulations following their respective cultures. With this law, the regional head election system, initially chosen by the national government, becomes a direct election.

In the reformation era, according to von Benda-Beckmann, F., & von Benda-Beckmann, K. (2012), the discourse of upholding Islamic law and local custom in West Sumatra co-exist in West Sumatra. Traditional discourse such as Local custom Basandi Syara, Syarak Basandi Kitabullah (culture based on shari'a, sharia-based on culture), Returning to Nagari (semiautonomous Minangkabau administrative unit) and Mambangkik Batang Tarandam (Reviving the dignity/honour that has long been hidden/honour neglected because of a situation) are often found in discussions The ABSSBK discourse has become a space for dialogue between local custom, religion and the State. Discourse Returning to Nagari and ABSSBK caused debate among intellectuals.

A historian who is also a Minangkabau figure Taufik Abdullah (1995: 8), considers that this discourse is only a form of narcissism, and Abdullah also predicts this discourse is the only utopia. One example of regulation of morality is clothing for women, prohibition of diseases people like to gamble, LGBT and adultery. It is due to the arrangement of morality that is easy to do and has explicit references. Biezelfeld (2007) alludes that women became one of the objects of revitalization custom.

Custom revitalization and decentralization are the entrance to the strengthening of populism. This argument, in line with Simon, GM (2009), stated that decentralization stimulates strengthening of moral politics in Indonesia, mainly West Sumatra Decentralization, has brought changes in the limits of social and political systems in West Sumatra. The change in the political system to a direct election system opens up opportunities for patronage between local elites and community leaders in a community; this raises public pragmatism that considers politics only an elite game. The custom revitalization also brings religious revitalization as a package following the philosophy of the Minang people, that custom is based on religion and religion is based on custom.

How Islamic populism encourages political morals, especially against women and minorities that exist in West Sumatra. Women often become the objective standard of morality that is enacted through the regulatory regions. One of them is the obligation to dress Muslim, especially in the education sector. Women are often the object of political, moral politics, as well as in West Sumatra. The target of moral standards is not only for Muslims but also for non-Muslim groups in the name of harmonization. This article intended to see how women and minorities in West Sumatra became the object of moral politics. Furthermore, why do women become the foundation or the spotlight in applying the politics of morals?

2 Methodology

Data were collected using face-to-face interviews and active observation from August-September 2019 in West Sumatra, Indonesia. This research addresses sensitive issues, for instance, LGBT and political views; therefore, some Informants asked their identities to be anonymous. Before conducting the interview, the interviewer provides an outline as an overview of the questions. The collection of data is done by using the method of purposive sampling and snowball sampling. Informants came from various backgrounds, the scholars, students, ulama and politicians.

3 Result and Discussion

3.1 Moral Politics, Islamic Populism and Decentralises

Populism is a global issue in authoritarian countries and democracies such as Britain, Poland, and the United States. Hadiz and Robinson (2017) saw that the competition between populist ultra-right and populism left brought the issue to a different conclusion. Polarisation of us versus them becomes a way of thinking to distinguish groups of the group from another. Some research shows that nationalism, class conflict and religion become the primary topics of discussion about populism (Hadiz: 2017, 2018, Berlet, C., & Lyons, MN: 2018, Taggart, P.: 2004).

According to Hadiz (2018), local custom as a cultural idiom, unifying religious interpretations are different. Those who support the Minangkabau customary rules also use sharia to legitimize their point of view. Solok is a pioneer in issuing regulations shades of sharia in the province of West Sumatra by issuing regulations on reading and writing the Koran in 2001 and then in 2002 regulation of women to wear Muslim clothes (hijab). After Solok issued local regulations, it was followed by the other cities in West Sumatra.

During the reign of Fauzi Bahar as Mayor of Padang City (2003-2013), a local regulation concerning the obligation to use Muslim women was issued for civil servants and students at public schools in Padang. Sam perceived the surge in the use of Muslimah - an owner of Salon in Padang, on a period that, although a woman should wear Muslim clothes, does not reduce activity in the salon.

According to Sam, the salon is still as busy as usual. Customers who come to the salon Sam usually wear a headscarf at work or school, but when in the salon, it is not a problem to open a hair salon mixed between men and women. The activity of opening and wearing the hijab is indeed commonly seen. Sometimes even in government offices, female employees who wear headscarves remove their headscarves because of the heat.

Interestingly, the application of moral politics rarely touches or regulates men's morals. We will find a common thing at a wedding party: a bunch of men listening to music until dawn. Singer female dress mini moved her body sensually in front of the drunk men. Beverage alcohol is forbidden for Muslims, but the party wedding host usually serves drinks to his guests, even if the guests were underage. Dio, a resident of Payakumbuh, shares the story that when he was still underage, his uncle would take him to come to the party wedding to enjoy the music and drink alcohol.

Padang Pariaman issued Regent Regulation No. 13 of 2016 concerning controlling live music or "Organ Tunggal". It responds to the circulation of vulgar photos and video dance vulgar in social media, and activities were deemed not following the norms of religion considered to tarnish the name of good Padang Pariaman. Although these regulations are general, the emphasis on moral regulation is more emphasized on women in the field.

Another local regulation regarding morality is the prohibition act with fellow species or LGBT issued by Padang Pariaman local regulation No. 10 the year 2018; outlined in the regulation is Article 25, which contains Groups of minorities such as LGBT in West Sumatra often become the target of commodities political campaigns and moral politicians. In 2018, the Government of Padang did an action campaign to clean Padang from LGBT activities. Mayor

of Padang, Mahyeldi, stated that LGBT behaviour was under the influence of Satan. Therefore, Mahyeldi prepared a rukyah team that would expel the jinn in the bodies of LGBT perpetrators.

The lack of impartiality to minorities is also an indicator of the weak enforcement of civil rights in West Sumatra. Civil rights indicators include freedom of speech, discriminatory rules, and the threat of violence for gender and ethnic reasons. In addition to the action initiated by Muslims, the government supports the campaign to issue a regulation and supports the campaign, especially in terms of anti-LGBT. The impartiality of the group of minorities is making theLGBT community shut their identities, primarily if they are affiliated with the institution of government and education.

Moreover, political morality is one form of indicator of strengthening Islamic Populists. One of the indications of strengthening Islamic populism is the emergence of the dichotomy of us versus them. Polarization is essential for populism to create images of who is becoming part of the group and who are not part of the group. To strengthen the solidarity of internal group then, according to Hadiz (2018) required suspension of difference, namely, to create a similarity of behaviour in terms of how to become a Muslim either. According to Hadiz, the success of Islamic populism in Turkey is one of the Islamic morality agendas.

In Egypt and Turkey, initiation for the setting based on sharia is done by the party of Islam, such as The Brotherhood Muslims and the AKP (Justice and Development Party). In Indonesia, to attract voters from an Islamic background, religious and nationalist based parties support sharia-based regulations. This is due to the fluidity of the parties' ideology in Indonesia so that the party ideology can quickly change depending on the party's interests. This condition is under the "political logic" of populism initiated by Laclau (2005).

3.2. Good Girls Do Not Go Bad

Minangkabau women in the novel (Pamuntjak: 1927) describe themselves as modern and professional but still do not neglect nature as a woman. Nowadays, it is not taboo for women Minangkabau to indulge in public space. It could be said that women in Minangkabau have an opportunity that is equal to the men of access to education and employment, nevertheless. However, women have a position that is the same, the demands of being a woman who still measures the standard of morals bound by the norms of customs and religion. As a communal society, Minangkabau women need to follow the moral politics prevailing in Minangkabau society.

Despite adhering to matrilineal principles, women's power is strictly in the private sphere, while men still control the public sector. West Sumatra Province consists of 12 regencies and seven cities, and all regional heads in West Sumatra are male. The domination of men in the public sphere in modern times today illustrates the condition of traditional society. Women have the right to private space, but men control the decision-making and leadership of a people. Despite adopting a matrilineal system, men still control women's lives (Wieringa: 1995).

During the reign of Fauzi Bahar as Mayor of Padang (2003-2013), a local regulation on the obligation to use Muslim women was issued to civil servants and public-school students in Padang. One of the reasons for the obligation to wear the veil is often echoed by officials to safeguard and protect women. Although there have not been any studies that describe the relevance of declining crime sexually with their obligation's clothes a Muslim, Rira sees no difference in the behaviour of men towards women who use the veil and do not use headscarves. "If I were to Pasar Raya (central market) with my friend, I would not wear the hijab, and my friend, who wears the hijab, remains just seduced by men ".

Parker (2006) also noted that the use of the veil is a form of disciplining themselves. The veil makes mobility and movement of women be reduced to help discipline yourself and make

women more aware with body them. Limitations of this help women to apply their disciplines; forms of discipline are constructed of awareness of self alone. The group of Islamic conservatives in West Sumatra encourages politicians to make morality in the spatial scope of the public. One of the efforts to maintain the community's morality was local regulations regulating women's clothing.

Why do women become the foundation or the spotlight in the application of the politics of morals? The division between good and evil, women, both good and bad, becomes the benchmark of a woman's rating. There is a moral panic about issues such as young women's dress and socializing in West Sumatra. According to Parker, L. (2006), symbolic connections between the veil and morality are solid, and the women use the veil associated with the good woman. Rira is a woman living in Padang. She is not wearing a hijab. However, her mother-in-law told him that if he wanted to visit them better off wearing the hijab because it felt more appropriate and beautiful.

State institutions and society also support exclusionism on the grounds of protecting local culture. At the beginning of 2021, there was a controversy between a public school in Padang. A non-Muslim student's guardian came to the SMKN (Vocational High School) 1 Kota Padang office to explain his objection to the condition of wearing Muslim clothes to his daughter. The school believes that there is no coercion but strives for uniformity in student clothing that has been notified before students are enrolled in the school. Incidents like this are not the first time in West Sumatra.

In many cases, we find that schools demand a non-Muslim woman to wear Muslim clothing based on uniformity. Not just clothes, George (a pseudonym), a former student of SMUN (high school) 3 Payakumbuh, experienced an incident being asked by the teacher to take Islamic studies at his school, even though the teacher knew that George was not a Muslim. The issue of Muslim clothing became a national polemic until, in 2021, the Minister of Education and Culture, Minister of Religion and Minister of Home Affairs issued a Joint Decree regarding schools not to prohibit and require uniforms with religious attributes.

The decision to choose uniforms is returned to students and teachers, whether to wear clothes with religious attributes or not. This decision brought back controversy in West Sumatra because it was considered against Islamic religious law and Minangkabau culture (Republika: 2021). Regardless of religion in public schools, Muslim clothing's uniformity is seen as part of conformity or respect for Minangkabau cultural customs. According to Fauzi Bahar, the regulation is to preserve the Minangkabau culture and protect women. If non-Muslims cannot follow these rules, they can look for other schools (BBC: 2021).

Support from local politicians is a logical consequence of the strength of Islam in West Sumatra. Lyn Parker (2014) discussed the twisted Islamization in the public sphere that dragged non-Muslims, especially their obligation to wear hijab. According to Parker, this incident is ironic considering the former history of Minangkabau, famous for openness and democracy, but now tends to retreat to the rear. Another non muslim student is Cikita, a student of SMAN I in Kota Payakumbuh. According to Cikita, she has to wear a hijab since she has no choice. All her non-Muslim women wear hijab too at school.

Therefore, she follows the regulation. However, if there is an opportunity to present her identity as a non-Muslim, Cikita will be happy to show that she is different. For Cikita, she needs to show others his identity. In contrast with Cikita, Sumarni, a junior high school teacher in Padang Pariaman, has a better bargaining position. Though she experienced an invitation to wear clothes a Muslim from her colleges, she refused because she did not want to lie. However, she realized that she is the only woman who does not wear a hijab in school, not affecting her. Sumarni is also aware of their tendency to aggressiveness when viewed as a distinction; the case

is different from the past 80 and 90s. "Now, if different people will show their displeasure, it is different from the past who were more tolerant".

Moral politics are practised in West Sumatra is a phenomenon locally and relates to concern against globalization, which changes the order of social and moral society. The presence of LGBT, pornography and free sex induce moral panics, fearing the public will be influenced by globalization on their children. Therefore, no wonder many parents persuade their children into Islamic Education and wish the children to be introduced to the religion early.

3.3. Exclusionism, Moral Antagonism and Right-Wing Support

During the Suharto regime, the establishment of an organization, especially religious organizations, strictly controls and supervises. Likewise, intellectual thinking is limited and supervised to remain following the corridors desired by the government. After Suharto's fall, in line with the spirit of freedom, found and organize

groups of Islamic organizations sprung. The phenomenon occurs in West Sumatra and evenly in Indonesia, ranging from religious, ethnic, and youth groups organization. Besides, the local Islamic mass organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, have solid and deep roots in West Sumatra. A new Islamic organization emerged which voiced the application of Islamic sharia in West Sumatra, for example, the Islamic Law Enforcement Committee (KPSI), the Minangkabau Muslim Movement (GMM), and the Islamic Defender Society Front (FMPI), Minangkabau Community Forum (FMM) and also the Java-based Islamic organizations such as the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the Islamic Defender Front (Islamic Defender Society Front (FMPI), Minangkabau Community Forum (FMM) and also the Java-based Islamic organizations such as the Hizbut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the Islamic Defender Front (FPI) have established local branches in West Sumatra. Their movements in promoting the implementation of sharia.

Besides that, they are also actively encouraging the government and the parliament to support their activities. This phase can also be interpreted as initiating the discourse on Islamic populism by mobilizing mass and mobilizing to carry out ethnic and religious agendas. According to the group of conservatives, the government should participate in interfering with handling the problem of the nation's morale. Although conservative Muslim groups support the implementation of sharia, they did not intend to implement sharia like in Aceh because they think the West Sumatra community is not ready and less suitable for culture in West Sumatra. Islamic groups combine different approaches; Islamic populism illustrates exclusionism, primarily assisted by local politicians using politics of moral exclusion and negative sentiment toward national government. Islamic populism embraces and engages with democracy and politics.

Why is Islam conservative developing in West Sumatra? According to Tans (2012), a group of conservatives will be developing at the provincial level rather than the village or town big as Jakarta. Wanto, a. (2012) further explains Islam politics in West Sumatra, especially in the Padang, ranging from government, daily consumption, cultural and media productions, civil society groups, social movements, and educational institutions. The strengthening of identity politics marks the critical point for the transformation of populism in Indonesia places polarisation based on religious sentiment as preconditions of the effectiveness of populist strategies in electoral mobilization (Margiansyah: 2019).

This finding is in line with Garadian (2014), who assesses grassroots strength as the key to the success of Islamic populism. This condition is also supported by robust political vehicles and populist narratives that attract people from various classes. Indeed, we cannot deny that the

role of regulatory regions is nuanced sharia, but the regulatory regions appear because there is support from the community. The shift toward greater regional autonomy in Indonesia since 2000 has enabled regional and local governments in West Sumatra to institute.

According to Hadiz (2018), the development of Islamic Populism is detrimental to minority groups. In European countries, immigrant groups, which they consider outsiders, are the right-wing selling point. In Indonesia, the issue of morality and religious purity is the agenda of this group's agenda. The middle class drives Islamic populism in West Sumatra by sponsoring the Islamic dawah movement. Conservative Islamic groups actively support local politicians whose Islamic narratives are in line with conservative Islamic agendas.

One form of support from local politicians to smooth out a conservative Islamic agenda is to get ulama to discuss regional regulations with sharia nuances. The application of local and religious values requires supervision and guidance from informal leaders. Ulama was also involved in formulating sharia regulations, Gusrizal who is now the chairman of West Sumatra MUI (Indonesian Ulema Council), was involved in making sharia regulations in Solok. Gamawan Fauzi, who was then Mayor of Solok, involved Gusrizal in a local regulation on reading and writing the Koran, Implementation of Zakat (giving charity to the poor) and the obligation of women to wear Muslimah clothing.

Conservative groups intended a more Islamic public space with Islamic clothing and a prohibition on immoral acts. The issue of morality is closer to the upper-middle class, while the issue close to the lower economic group, namely social welfare, additional subsidies or an increase in labour wages, is rarely brought up by conservative groups. Conservative Islamic moral politics are also practised in Turkey. According to Hadiz (2017), the success of Islamic populism in Turkey is one of the Islamic morality agendas. In Egypt and Turkey, the setting's initiation based on sharia is done by the party of Islam, such as The Brotherhood Muslims and the AKP (Justice and Development Party). In Indonesia, to attract voters from an Islamic background, religious and nationalist based parties support sharia-based regulations.

The strengthening of the conservative Islamic group and the decrease in the index democracy from 2009-2019, especially in civil liberties (BPS: 2012-2019). Minority groups such as non-Muslims, LGBT, and Chinese descent often experience discrimination and society's negative stigma. Thomas (pseudonym), a civil servant, has a different sexual orientation and admitted that he was forced to make up stories to have a girlfriend who lives in Jakarta. He had to do this because he wanted to hide his identity while avoiding the question about his love life. Even though being LGBT is not illegal, Thomas realizes that society is increasingly conservative and not ready to accept LGBT, especially his civil servants' status. The existence of LGBT within the scope of LGBT family and friendship has begun to be accepted. Thomas himself did not hide his status from his family and friends. Therefore, although he must hide his identity in the work environment and society, accepting family and friends becomes a "safe haven".

In the frame of Populism (Wodak: 2015), the LGBT and immoral actions were appointed as a scapegoat because of the bad conditions inflicted on LGBT as the others. Populist is convinced of the causes of ugliness and misfortune that occur due to LGBT and immoral actors. In such a context of society and culture, we can briefly see the media and formal institutions' role in enhancing populism. They have capitalized on religion-based identity narratives; according to Hadiz (2018), politicians build public support to gain power. The core of populism entails the moral and causal opposition between "the good people" and "culprit others" (Hameleers, Michael, Linda Bos, and Claes H. de Vreese: 2017). In line with this conceptualization of populism Taggart (2000) describes populist doing exclusionism, the tendency for populists to be explicit in excluding certain groups as not part of the real 'people' finds a strong echo in the conception of what Taggart called as heartland, while in context of Islamic Populism Hadiz called as an ummah. Exclusionism is an attempt to differentiate and, at the same time, purify, according to Taggart (2000), as an attempt to construct an identity, as an awareness of who is not part of us rather than who we are.

4 Conclusion

These articles have discussed how populism in West Sumatra supports the strength of an institution of society and the government. The collapse of the Soeharto regime meant the beginning of a new change, which was considered a significant change; the people of Minangkabau will also be affected by this change. Therefore, to keep the local custom and social structure not destroyed, the Minangkabau society must commit identity politics that all to be relevant and recognized.

Because the fall of Soeharto was considered a significant change, identity politics must also be made more robust and more intensive. Strengthening this identity is vital for the Minangkabau community because local customs are the basis and guide for living. However, women and minority groups become targets of regulation through local regulations in the name of increasing piety and maintaining morality.

In the end, the politicization of morals dissolved our society's real problem, which is corruption. Kahin (1999), a researcher who has done much research in West Sumatra, is worried about the increasing corruption in West Sumatra. Although corruption occurs nationally, Kahin concerns the political system as making West Sumatra behind compared to other regions. According to Kahin, "West Sumatra no longer surpassed other regions in the quality of education its children enjoyed, and that its people no longer were relatively highly represented in Indonesia's intellectual and political life". Although it is too early to conclude the link between moral politicization, primarily focusing on women as the source of development stagnation in West Sumatra, it is time to turn attention to public issues rather than individual personal issues.

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