

From Hegemony to Coalition: The ANC's Decline and the Era of Power-Sharing in South Africa

Colins Imoh¹

[¹{c.imoh@bradford.ac.uk}](mailto:c.imoh@bradford.ac.uk)

Department of Peace Studies and International Development, Faculty of Management, Sciences and Engineering, University of Bradford¹, Bradford, United Kingdom

Abstract. The 2024 South African general election marks a seismic inflection point in post-apartheid trajectory, signalling the definitive conclusion of three decades of African National Congress (ANC) hegemony. For the first time since 1994 democratic transition, the ANC's failed to secure an absolute majority needing the formation of a multifaceted Government of National Unity (GNU).

This paper explores the socio-economic catalysts of this contraction—specifically systemic corruption, energy crisis and persistent wealth inequality through a dual theoretical framework: secular decline of dominant party systems and structural mechanics of consociational democracy. Analysing the tension between historical power concentration and the nascent imperative for cross-cleavage cooperation, it evaluates the GNU through the lens of elite accommodation and 'compensatory consociationalism'. It interrogates the emergence of the radical 'Progressive Caucus' as a potent counter-hegemonic force, representing a significant portion of the electorate disillusioned by the perceived stagnation of material transformation.

Ultimately, it assesses if this inaugural coalition era facilitates a 'second renewal' of the democratic project or signifies the terminal fragmentation of the ANC. The findings suggest that South Africa's political stability hinges on the volatile dynamics of multi-party governance and state's capacity to navigate profound structural inequality within a framework of precarious power-sharing.

Keywords: ANC, Government of National Unity (GNU), Consociationalism, Dominant Party Decline, Progressive Caucus, South African Politics 2024

1. Introduction: The Anatomy of Hegemonic Decay

"We are eating this elephant bit by bit." Julius Malema's (2024) provocative metaphor aptly encapsulates the incremental yet relentless erosion of the African National Congress's (ANC) political suzerainty. For three decades, the dawn of South African democracy was synonymous with the 'Rainbow Nation' ethos, consolidated under the undisputed moral and political authority of the ANC. However, the 2024 general election results have decisively closed this foundational chapter, thrusting the Republic into an unprecedented era of compulsory coalition governance. This seismic shift represents more than a mere electoral setback; it signifies a definitive historical rupture for the movement of Nelson Mandela.

Since the inaugural democratic polls of 1994, the ANC consistently secured comfortable governing majorities, projecting an aura of electoral invincibility. In 2024, this façade collapsed as the party lost both its national majority and its grip on the socio-economic heartlands of KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng (Electoral Commission of South Africa [IEC], 2024). This fragmentation of the political landscape indicates that the liberation movement must now navigate a reality where power is no longer an inherited right, but a contested commodity to be negotiated with erstwhile rivals.

The 2024 results mark the culmination of a protracted process of 'liberation movement decay' (Southall, 2013)—a phenomenon observed across post-colonial contexts where movements transitioning to state governance experience a steady attrition of popular support, internal cohesion, and ideological idealism. For the ANC, this 'hegemonic decline' (Booyesen, 2018) appears increasingly irreversible. Paralysed by internecine factionalism centred on patronage rather than policy, the party has struggled with the existential transition from an anti-apartheid resistance movement to a modern democratic administration. As Melber (2009) suggests, such transitions require a cognitive shift in governance that many liberation movements find impossible to achieve.

Central to this decay is a perceived 'culture of permanent entitlement' among a nascent political elite, which facilitated the onset of state capture and the subsequent hollowing out of public trust (Mlambo and Thusi, 2023). Furthermore, the post-1994 economic settlement failed to deliver the promised 'liberation dividend' of broad-based material improvement, instead entrenching deep-seated structural frustrations. In a desperate bid to retain waning control, the ANC increasingly conflated party and state interests, a move that exacerbated internal fractures and further stalled the democratic transition (Melber, 2009; Southall, 2013). This paper interrogates the 2024 coalition as the terminal stage of this decay, evaluating whether the current Government of National Unity (GNU) offers a genuine aperture for national renewal or represents the final, fragmented chapter of ANC dominance.

2. Theoretical Framework: Dominant Party Decline and Consociationalism

To provide a rigorous analytical foundation for this study, a dual-layered theoretical framework is employed. This approach synthesises the literature on the life cycle of dominant party systems with the structural mechanics of consociational democracy to explain South Africa's transition from liberation hegemony to compulsory power-sharing.

2.1. The Anatomy of Hegemonic Exhaustion: The Life Cycle of Dominant Parties

In contemporary political science, single-party dominance is increasingly conceptualised as a transient phenomenon rather than a permanent state. While hegemonic entities may maintain executive control for decades, they are often characterised by a long-term secular decline, which represents a persistent erosion of electoral support operating beneath the surface of intermittent tactical victories (Carty, 2022). The trajectory of this decay is mediated by specific institutional and social configurations. In developed democracies, this process is frequently accelerated by

voter apathy and opposition fragmentation, which gradually attenuate the dominant party's mandate (Carty, 2022). The enduring success of 'government parties' is historically linked to their integration into the foundational essence of the political order. By positioning themselves as the indispensable stewards of nation-building, these organisations transcend partisan boundaries to become synonymous with the regime's legitimacy (Dasgupta, 2014).

However, this systemic integration invariably yields what may be termed the 'curse of strong roots'. The symbiosis between the party apparatus and state resources precipitates endemic corruption and 'state capture', which eventually transition from ethical lapses into structural liabilities. This process alienates the electorate and catalyses the party's displacement (Greene, 2007; Carty, 2022). The terminal phase of dominance results in diverse systemic configurations, ranging from total organisational dissolution, as seen with Italy's Christian Democrats (Bull, 2002), to survival as a significantly weakened actor, as evidenced by Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (Ando et al., 2015). Alternatively, a party may undergo radical internal reform and reconstruction, typified by Mexico's PRI after 2000 (Camp, 2011). In the South African context, the ANC's decline follows the trajectory of hegemonic exhaustion. Its historical role as the primary architect of democracy granted it a 'valence advantage'—a public perception of unique moral and technical competence—that marginalised competition for nearly three decades (Carty, 2022). This dominance fostered an 'awkward embrace' between the movement and the state, blurring the distinction between partisan interests and constitutional functions (Giliomee and Simkins, 2005).

As the ANC prioritised its 'national project' over institutional independence, it enabled a system of 'hyper-incumbency' sustained by massive resource asymmetry (Greene, 2007). However, this patronage-based stability is contingent upon a continuous flow of resources. The hollowing out of state-owned enterprises and the erosion of the political economy of dominance have triggered a 'factional bargaining' crisis (Sakaiya and Maeda, 2014). When a party can no longer satisfy internal factions via state resources, marginalised elites defect to form splinter organisations. The emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party represents the final stage of this decay, wherein splinters cannibalise the ANC's moral authority by claiming the 'authentic' revolutionary mantle that the 'Government Party' has discarded (Carty, 2022).

2.2. Consociationalism and the 'Elite Cartel' Model

The collapse of majoritarian dominance necessitates a shift toward consociationalism, representing a paradigmatic departure from the 'winner-take-all' orthodoxies of Westminster-style democracy. Within deeply segmented societies, consociational theory posits that legitimate governance must be an exercise in radical inclusion rather than majoritarian exclusion (Lijphart, 1969; 2015). The operational core of this framework is the 'elite cartel', which involves strategic cooperation among leadership figures representing divergent societal subcultures. This top-down approach recognises that in fragmented societies, where the masses may remain antagonistic, stability must be engineered at the political apex. Elites, recognising the catastrophic systemic costs of prolonged conflict, form a 'grand coalition' to manage centrifugal tensions (Wolff, 2010).

The efficacy of this model relies on several critical pillars, including elite agency and the legitimacy to accommodate divergent interests, such as Switzerland's *Zauberformel* or 'Magic Formula' (Lehmbruch, 1993). Furthermore, leaders must possess the capacity for cross-cleavage

engagement to engage in collaborative governance with traditional rivals, as exemplified by Northern Ireland's 1998 Good Friday Agreement (Dixon, 2005). A sustained elite commitment to preserve cohesion is often driven by a pragmatic fear of state fragmentation, a feature typical of Lebanon's confessionalist system (Bogaards, 2019). This paper argues that the 2024 Government of National Unity (GNU) represents a move toward 'compensatory consociationalism'. Unlike the 1994 settlement, which was rooted in a moral imperative for reconciliation, the current power-sharing arrangement is a survival mechanism designed to compensate for the ANC's lost majority. This creates a significant 'legitimacy gap' if the majority of the Black electorate perceives the elite coalition as prioritising market stability and neoliberal continuity over radical social redress, risking the GNU becoming an unstable 'cartel' rather than a sustainable democratic settlement.

3. Research Methodology: Case Study Design and Deductive Synthesis

This research employs a qualitative case study design to investigate the structural transition of the South African party system following the 2024 general election. The case study approach is strategically utilised to interrogate the 'critical case' of the African National Congress's (ANC) electoral contraction and the subsequent emergence of a consociational Government of National Unity (GNU). By focusing on this specific juncture, the methodology allows for a granular analysis of how long-standing hegemonic structures fragment under the pressure of democratic volatility. This design is particularly suited to the research objectives, as it facilitates a deep exploration of the causal mechanisms—such as systemic corruption and the failure of the liberation dividend—that have driven the ANC toward its current state of hegemonic exhaustion.

Data for this study were gathered through a comprehensive desktop review and a systematic document analysis of primary institutional sources. This includes the interrogation of official election results from the Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), a comparative analysis of party manifestos, and an examination of official legislative declarations and coalition agreements. These primary data points were triangulated with an extensive body of secondary academic literature focused on the evolution of dominant party systems and the mechanics of consociational democracy. Such triangulation ensures a rigorous theoretical foundation, allowing the empirical findings of the 2024 election to be situated within the broader global discourse on party system decay and elite accommodation.

The analytical process follows a deductive content analysis method, wherein qualitative data were categorised and interpreted according to established theoretical indicators. These indicators include hegemonic exhaustion, resource asymmetry, factional bargaining, and the 'elite cartel' model of power-sharing. This methodology enables a robust exploration of the shifting power dynamics between the governing coalition and radical counter-hegemonic forces, such as the Progressive Caucus. By applying these pre-defined theoretical lenses to the primary data, the research provides a compelling assessment of whether the current political realignment represents a sustainable 'second renewal' or the terminal fragmentation of the liberation-era governing party.

4. Factors of Failure: A Referendum on Governance

The monumental decline of the African National Congress (ANC) in the 2024 general election represents more than a mere electoral setback; it is the culmination of a protracted inability to improve the material quality of life for the South African populace. The transition from a liberation movement to a struggling governing partner is rooted in a trifecta of systemic failures: endemic corruption, a debilitating energy crisis, and soaring unemployment rates that have fostered a climate of profound voter dissatisfaction (World Bank, 2022). Consequently, the 2024 polls served as a definitive referendum on ANC governance, with the results illustrating a fundamental shift in the national political landscape.

Table 1. 2024 National Election Results Summary

Political Party	Abbreviation	% of National Vote
African National Congress	ANC	40.18%
Democratic Alliance	DA	21.81%
uMkhonto weSizwe	MK	14.58%
Economic Freedom Fighters	EFF	9.52%
Inkatha Freedom Party	IFP	3.85%
Patriotic Alliance	PA	2.06%
Others	—	8.00%
(Source: IEC, 2024)		

The 17% loss in support relative to the 2019 results was not an isolated event but rather the climax of a grassroots crisis that was first signalled during the 2021 local government elections, where the ANC’s support dropped to 46% (Stats SA, 2021). Despite these clear empirical warnings, the party failed to arrest a systematic decline that has been evident since 2009.

4.1. Longitudinal Trends and Racial Demographics

To fully comprehend the current political realignment, one must analyse the correlation between shifting voter shares and South Africa’s evolving racial composition. According to the 2022 Census, the population comprises 81.4% Black, 8.2% Coloured, 7.3% White, and 2.7% Indian residents (Stats SA, 2023). When these demographics are extrapolated onto the party system, a distinct 'ethnic coloration' emerges. Despite the constitutional ideal of non-racialism, political parties remain largely defined by specific ethnic identities, with support bases reflecting deep-seated demographic divisions. This alignment suggests that political loyalty continues to be viewed through the lens of group representation rather than broad ideological consensus.

Table 2. Comparative Share of Votes (1994–2024)

Year	Party - Share of Votes							
	ANC	DA	EFF	MK	IFP	PA	Black Dominated Parties	Others
1994	62.65 %	1.73%			10.54		73.64%	NNP-20.39%; ACDP-0.45%

1999	66.35 %	9.56%			8.58 %		79.78%	UDM- 3.42; NNP - 6.87%; ACDP- 1.43%
2004	69.69 %	12.37 %			6.97 %		78.94%	COPE, 7.42%; ID - 1.73%; UDM- 2.28%; NNP- 1.65%
2009	65.90 %	16.66 %,			4.55 %,		71.30%	NPF- 1.57%, ID- 0.92; UDM 0.85%
2014	62.15 %	22.23 %	6.35 %		2.40 %		70.89%	
2019	57.50 %	20.77 %	10.80 %		3.38 %		72.52%	VF+2.38%, ACDP -0.84
2024	40.18 %	21.81 %	9.52 %	14.58 %	3.85 %	2.06 %	70.19%	8%

*Parties with primarily Black voter bases (ANC, EFF, MK, IFP).

Data indicates that Black-dominated parties have consistently maintained an aggregate share above 70%. However, since 2009, there has been a slight contraction in this share as the Democratic Alliance (DA) increased its reach. In a nation that remains the world's most economically unequal (World Bank, 2022), the DA's business-friendly platform has become increasingly attractive to a segment of the electorate disillusioned by the ANC's economic stewardship.

4.2. Balkanisation and the Rise of the Opposition

The ANC has suffered from protracted internal 'balkanisation'. The 2012 expulsion of Julius Malema led to the formation of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), which effectively cannibalised the ANC's leftist support base (Malema, 2013). More recently, the emergence of the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party under former President Jacob Zuma dealt a devastating blow to the party's core. The narrative of Zuma as a 'scapegoat' for systemic failures resonated with a significant portion of the electorate, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal (Yende and Yende, 2022; Zuma, 2024). The MK party's 14.58% share directly stripped the ANC of its governing majority, marking the final stage of hegemonic decay.

4.3. The Government of National Unity: A Fragile Synthesis

The resulting Government of National Unity (GNU) is an ideologically diverse coalition that operates under significantly different power dynamics than the 1994 iteration. In 1994, the ANC formed a GNU from a position of overwhelming strength to ensure national stability; in 2024, it entered the arrangement from a position of historic vulnerability (Ramaphosa, 2024).

The coalition is a tenuous synthesis of conflicting ideologies:

- The Democratic Alliance (DA): Champions liberal-democratic values and market-led growth while opposing race-based redress (Steenhuisen, 2024).

- The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP): A pro-market conservative entity with a traditional Zulu-speaking base, emphasising devolution and the *Ubuntu* principle (Hlabisa, 2024).
- The Patriotic Alliance (PA): A populist movement drawing significant Coloured support, advocating for hardline policies such as mass deportation and the reinstatement of the death penalty (McKenzie, 2024).

This convergence of fundamentally opposed worldviews underscores the GNU's inherent fragility and suggests that its primary function is one of crisis management rather than ideological cohesion.

5. Discussion: Fragmentation, Identity, and the Erosion of Hegemony

The longitudinal data from 1994 to 2024 reveals a dual phenomenon: the ANC's precipitous decline alongside the incremental stabilisation of the Democratic Alliance (DA). This trend suggests a fundamental transition in South African political behaviour, shifting from historical-collective voting patterns—rooted in liberation identity—to individualistic, performance-based considerations. This evolution is inextricably linked to shifting racial and economic demographics and the emergence of a 'post-liberation' electorate.

5.1. The Racial and Economic Dimensions of Party Support

While Black-dominated parties have historically commanded over 70% of the national vote, the 'resource asymmetry' identified by Greene (2007) has failed to create a monolithic or enduring electoral bloc. Between 1994 and 2009, these parties held a consistent share of between 73% and 79%; however, since 2009, this has compressed to a lower range of 70% to 73%. This contraction correlates with the rising appeal of the DA among disillusioned urbanites and the growing Black middle class. As Giliomee and Simkins (2005) theorise, when the 'national project' fails to deliver tangible socioeconomic progress, the 'awkward embrace' between the liberation movement and the state tightens into a systemic crisis. For the 'born-free' generation, struggle credentials hold diminishing currency compared to immediate demands for employment and infrastructure, reflecting a pivotal shift toward democratic individualism.

5.2. Balkanisation and the Breakdown of Factional Bargaining

The internal balkanisation of the ANC provides a modern illustration of Sakaiya and Maeda's (2014) theory regarding the failure of factional bargaining. When a dominant party can no longer satisfy diverse internal interests through the distribution of patronage, major schisms become an institutional inevitability. The 2012 expulsion of Julius Malema and the subsequent rise of the EFF stripped the ANC of a vital youth demographic and its radical intellectual flank. This fragmentation reached a terminal stage with the marginalisation of Jacob Zuma. Whether perceived as a perpetrator of state capture or a political scapegoat, Zuma's treatment fractured the ANC's internal bargaining process. The resulting formation of the MK party, which siphoned 14.58% of the national vote in 2024, represents the final collapse of the 'broad church' model of liberation politics.

5.3. The New Coalition: A Second Rainbow or a Strategic Demise?

The 2024 coalition brings together 'strange bedfellows' whose contradictory platforms directly challenge the ANC's identity as the singular 'Government Party' (Carty, 2022). The DA's principled opposition to race-based affirmative action clashes with the ANC's transformative ideals, while the IFP's advocacy for traditionalist pluralism contrasts with the ANC's centralised liberal constitutionalism. This synthesis suggests that the ANC is no longer the sole architect of the South African state. By sharing power, the party risks losing its 'valence advantage'—the public perception of its unique and inherent competence to rule (Carty, 2022). In this arrangement, partners like the DA may claim credit for administrative stability and technocratic successes, while the ANC continues to bear the historical weight of systemic decay and service delivery failures.

5.4. The Progressive Caucus: A Radical Counter-Hegemony

The erosion of ANC hegemony has catalysed the formation of a formidable counter-hegemonic bloc. The Progressive Caucus (PC), holding approximately 25% of parliamentary seats, represents a seismic shift in legislative dynamics. Anchored by the EFF and MK, the PC positions itself as a 'radical shield' against perceived neoliberal regression within the GNU (Progressive Caucus, 2024). Its ideological core centres on Radical Economic Transformation (RET), advocating for land expropriation without compensation and the nationalisation of strategic assets such as the Reserve Bank and mines. By utilising anti-colonial rhetoric, the PC frames the ANC-DA partnership as a 'marriage of convenience' designed to protect 'white monopoly capital' (Malema, 2024; Zuma, 2024). However, the caucus's efficacy remains complicated by fragmentation; the defection of several initial members to the GNU in exchange for executive positions highlights the ongoing tension between ideological purity and the persistent lure of state patronage (Booyesen, 2024).

5.5. Political Realignment: Identifying the Winners and Losers

The intricate nature of the South African political landscape, characterised by its fluid and dynamic evolution, suggests that the identification of political 'winners' and 'losers' remains contingent upon specific temporal and situational contexts. The 2024 general election represented a pivotal shift, failing to deliver a decisive mandate for the African National Congress (ANC) and necessitating a fundamental reassessment of party power dynamics.

The market-oriented faction of the ANC, under the leadership of Cyril Ramaphosa, may be perceived as a primary casualty of this shift. By entering into a Government of National Unity (GNU) with the Democratic Alliance (DA), the faction has been forced into significant compromise with ideological rivals, a move that risks deeply alienating the party's left-wing base (Booyesen, 2024). In contrast, the DA has successfully consolidated its status as a central power broker. By maintaining a consistent 22% support base while simultaneously gaining unprecedented executive influence, the party has effectively transitioned from a permanent opposition fixture to a key architect of national governance.

Furthermore, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the uMkhonto weSizwe (MK) party stand to benefit by positioning themselves as "moral" alternatives to the centrist coalition. By refusing to engage in a partnership with the DA, the EFF preserves its ideological purity and radical credentials. Simultaneously, the MK party—by championing Radical Economic

Transformation (RET) and framing the GNU as a betrayal of revolutionary principles—occupies a perceived "moral high ground" for voters disillusioned by centre-right pragmatism. This strategic posturing threatens to further balkanise the ANC's traditional constituency, accelerating the fragmentation of the liberation movement's historic hegemony

6. Conclusion: The Sunset of Hegemony and the Rise of the Progressive Caucus

The 2024 general election represents the definitive rupture of the 'awkward embrace' (Giliomee and Simkins, 2005) that characterised the South African political settlement for three decades. The transition of the African National Congress (ANC) from a monolithic liberation movement to a vulnerable coalition partner provides a salient case study in the secular decline of dominant party systems. This erosion of hegemony is deeply rooted in the party's inability to sustain a 'liberation dividend', thereby depleting the resource asymmetry that historically underpinned its electoral invincibility (Greene, 2007). By 2024, the ANC had succumbed to the 'curse of strong roots'; a confluence of systemic state capture, chronic service degradation, and a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.63—amongst the highest globally—rendered its traditional legitimacy unsustainable.

As the era of ANC dominance collapsed, the South African political order underwent a structural shift toward a consociational framework. The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) signifies a strategic pivot toward an 'elite cartel' model (Lijphart, 1969), designed to mitigate the volatility of a society fractured by profound racial and class disparities. In a longitudinal context where the top 10% of the population retains over 80% of national wealth, the GNU functions as a grand coalition prioritising systemic stability over ideological purity. This phenomenon may be termed 'Compensatory Consociationalism', wherein power-sharing is necessitated by political survival and the avoidance of state collapse rather than a genuine return to the reconciliatory ethos of the 1990s.

The prospect of the ANC reclaiming an absolute parliamentary majority remains statistically and sociologically improbable. While proponents market the GNU as a stabilising 'Second Rainbow', the coalition fundamentally dilutes the ANC's executive reach and erodes its historical mystique as the sole architect of the South African state. The pre-election 'Doomsday Coalition' narrative successfully served to isolate the radical left in the short term, despite the fact that the four largest Black-dominated parties—the ANC, EFF, MK, and IFP—collectively represent a commanding 68.13% of the electorate.

This 'decantation of the left' has catalysed the emergence of the Progressive Caucus, a formidable parliamentary alliance holding 25% of seats. The rise of this bloc signals a fundamental shift in the national psyche: thirty years post-apartheid, the absence of material transformation is driving a significant portion of the electorate toward radical, populist alternatives. Consequently, the ANC is currently trapped in a strategic paradox. Should the GNU succeed in its administrative objectives, the Democratic Alliance (DA) is positioned to claim credit for technocratic efficiency. Conversely, should the coalition fail to address the underlying socio-economic crisis, the ANC will bear the historical brunt of that failure as the senior partner.

Ultimately, the 'Government Party' brand (Carty, 2022) has been permanently fragmented. The rise of the Progressive Caucus further suggests a potential geopolitical realignment, as their platform advocates for a more pronounced pivot toward Eastern blocs, potentially signalling a departure from the ANC's traditional policy of non-alignment (Ramaphosa, 2024). South Africa's political future no longer hinges upon the internal renewal of a single movement, but rather on the state's capacity to navigate its own fragmentation within a precarious era of compulsory power-sharing. This analysis concludes that future scholarship must shift its focus from the mechanics of single-party dominance to the inherent volatility of multi-party coalitions and the persistent, burgeoning appeal of radical alternatives in conditions of profound structural inequality.

References

- [1] African National Congress. (2024). Statement of intent of the 2024 Government of National Unity. ANC Communications.
- [2] Ando, Y. U., Hosoya, Y., Mori, S., Ochi, T., & Takenaka, H. (2015). Looking for leadership: The dilemma of political leadership in Japan. Brookings Institution Press.
- [3] Bogaards, M. (2019). Formal and informal consociational institutions: A comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 25(1), 27–42.
- [4] Bogaards, M., Helms, L., & Lijphart, A. (2019). The importance of consociationalism for twenty-first century politics and political science. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 25(4), 341–356.
- [5] Booysen, S. (2024). Accountability and representation in South Africa's 2024 elections: A reshaping of the political landscape. *Journal of African Elections*, 23(2), 1–22.
- [6] Bull, M. (2002). The Italian Christian Democrats. In *Political parties and the European Union* (pp. 157–172). Routledge.
- [7] Camp, R. A. (2011). The Revolution's second generation: The miracle, 1946–1982 and collapse of the PRI, 1982–2000. In *A companion to Mexican history and culture* (pp. 468–479). Wiley-Blackwell.
- [8] Carty, R. K. (2022). *The government party: Political dominance in democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- [9] Dasgupta, A. (2014). The curse of strong roots in dominant party collapse: Evidence from India's Green Revolution. SSRN Scholarly Paper.
- [10] Democratic Alliance. (2024). *Rescue South Africa: 2024 election manifesto*. DA Media Office.

- [11] Dixon, P. (2005). Why the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland is not consociational. *The Political Quarterly*, 76(3), 357–367.
- [12] Electoral Commission of South Africa. (2024). 2024 national and provincial elections: Final results report. IEC.
- [13] Flores-Macías, G. A. (2018). Mexico's PRI. In *Life after dictatorship: Authoritarian successor parties worldwide* (pp. 257–283). Cambridge University Press.
- [14] Giliomee, H., & Simkins, C. (Eds.). (2005). *The awkward embrace: One-party domination and democracy in industrialising countries*. Routledge.
- [15] Greene, K. F. (2007). *Why dominant parties lose: Mexico's democratization in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- [16] Higson, R. (2008). Anti-consociationalism and the Good Friday Agreement: A rejoinder. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development*, 12, 1–17.
- [17] Hlabisa, V. (2024). *The IFP's role in a stable South Africa*. IFP Press.
- [18] Hrynkow, C. (2012). *Peace without consensus: Power-sharing politics in Northern Ireland*.
- [19] Langston, J. K. (2017). *Democratization and authoritarian party survival: Mexico's PRI*. Oxford University Press.
- [20] Lehmbruch, G. (1993). Consociational democracy and corporatism in Switzerland. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, 23(2), 43–60.
- [21] Lijphart, A. (1969). Consociational democracy. *World Politics*, 21(2), 207–225.
- [22] Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in plural societies: A comparative exploration*. Yale University Press.
- [23] Lijphart, A. (1985). *Power-sharing in South Africa*. Institute of International Studies, University of California.
- [24] Lijphart, A. (2015). Polarization and democratization. In N. Persily (Ed.), *Solutions to political polarization in America* (pp. 73–82). Cambridge University Press.
- [25] Malema, J. (2024). *Political report to the EFF 10-year anniversary and election post-mortem*. EFF Press.
- [26] Melber, H. (2009). Southern African liberation movements as governments and the limits to liberation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 36(121), 451–459.

- [27] McKenzie, G. (2024). The PA's vision for law and order. PA Communications.
- [28] Mlambo, D. N., & Thusi, X. (2023). South Africa's persistent social ills post-1994 and the deterioration of the African National Congress: Is the country heading towards a failing state? *Politeia*, 42(1).
- [29] Progressive Caucus. (2024). Founding declaration of the progressive caucus. Parliament of South Africa.
- [30] Ramaphosa, C. (2024). Presidential inauguration address. The Presidency.
- [31] Sakaiya, S., & Maeda, K. (2014). Explaining the breakdown of dominant party systems: Party splits and the mechanisms of factional bargaining. *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 15(3), 397–415.
- [32] Schoppa, L. J. (2011). The evolution of Japan's party system: Politics and policy in an era of institutional change. University of Toronto Press.
- [33] Southall, R. (2013). Liberation movements in power: Party and state in Southern Africa. Boydell and Brewer.
- [34] Southall, R. (2017). From liberation movement to party machine? The ANC in South Africa. In *Post-colonial struggles for a democratic Southern Africa* (pp. 61–78). Routledge.
- [35] Statistics South Africa. (2023). Census 2022 statistical release. Government Printer.
- [36] Steenhuisen, J. (2024). The DA's commitment to the GNU. DA Press Office.
- [37] Tannous, M. (2018). Lebanon: A consociational model to be refined. *Issues Brief*, 10, 15–18.
- [38] Wertman, D. A. (2019). The Christian Democrats: A party in crisis. In *The end of post-war politics in Italy* (pp. 12–30). Routledge.
- [39] Wolff, S. (2010). Consociationalism, power sharing, and politics at the center. In *Oxford research encyclopedia of international studies*. Oxford University Press.
- [40] World Bank. (2022). Inequality in southern Africa: An assessment of the southern African customs union. 2022 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank 1818 H Street NW, 20433.
- [41] Yende, N. E., & Yende, S. J. (2022). Zuma's outcry of betrayal: A content analysis of "Sengimanxebanxeba Zinsizwa", 2005–2018. *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, 11(2), 101.
- [42] Zuma, J. (2024). MK Party policy briefing on land and economy. MK Party.