

Sea Development Trend and Piracy

Widitusha Winduhiswara

{widitusha@gmail.com}

Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, University of Prof. Dr. Moestopo (Beragama), Jakarta, Indonesia.

Abstract. This study aims to find out the role of Saracen International as Private Military Company in overcoming the sea piracy that occurred in the Gulf of Aden. The research method used in this research is descriptive research method. Data collection techniques in this study are through literature studies, books, journals, articles, reports and internet sources. The concept used in this research is Private Military Company concept. This study illustrates on how the role of Saracen International in collaboration with the Puntland government in overcoming the existing pirate phenomena in the region. Based on the concept used, the phenomenon of pirates in the Gulf of Aden region pressures the local government to find a solution and one of them is to use Private Military Company services so that the number of piracies in the region decreased.

Keywords: Pirates, Saracen International, Private Military Company, Puntland, Somalia.

1 Introduction



Fig. 1. Gulf of Aden

Source: <https://id.pinterest.com/pin/725924033664434488/>

The phenomenon of sea piracy in the Gulf of Aden is an international phenomenon that is very troubling to ship companies that use the Gulf of Aden route. Located between Yemen and Somalia,

the Gulf of Aden is a trade route for ships bound for the Red Sea through the Strait of Babel-Mandeb. It is estimated that 16,000 ships annually pass through the Gulf of Aden which is also the first gateway to the Suez Canal which connects the Mediterranean Sea and the Arabian Sea in the Indian Ocean. The ships carry oil from the Middle East and goods from Asia to Europe and North America.

Since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Gulf of Aden and the sea along the eastern part of Somalia have become very important for the European Union, merchant ships now do not have to travel far past the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa to reach the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez Canal plays a very vital role for the world economy, especially for Europe because about 80% of merchant ships pass through it. In addition to being the main door to the Suez Canal as well as being the entry and exit point for commodities and trade goods for countries in Europe, the Gulf of Aden waters are also a route for tankers transporting gas and oil from the Arabian Peninsula countries. About 11% of gas and oil exported by Arabian Peninsula countries passes through the Gulf of Aden which is mostly sold for the needs of the European market as well as the United States. In addition, 95% of trade activities of EU member states pass through the sea route and the Gulf of Aden in Somalia is one of the main routes that must be passed [1].

In the year 2008, a total of 111 hijacking incidents occurred, with 42 of them resulting in successful outcomes, wherein ransoms were obtained in exchange for the release of the hijacked ships and their hostages. Nonetheless, this represents only a small fraction of the more than 30,000 ships that undertook voyages across the Gulf of Aden during that same year. In response to this escalating issue, on October 5, 2008, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1838. This resolution urged nations with naval capabilities to take action against the prevalence of maritime piracy. Despite this international initiative, the effectiveness of the resolution sanctioned by the UN Security Council has been questioned, particularly in terms of its ability to promptly address instances of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden. [2].

During the initial months of 2009, incidents of maritime piracy experienced a staggering tenfold surge compared to the previous year's statistics. By mid-April of that year, a total of 79 piracy incidents had been documented, with 21 of them culminating in successful acts of piracy. The majority of these hijacking occurrences attributed to Somali pirates were concentrated within the Gulf of Aden. Nonetheless, there was a discernible expansion in the scope of their activities, as Somali pirates commenced seizing ships in regions as far-reaching as the waters off the coasts of Kenya and India (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2011).

Maritime piracy has increased off the coast of Somalia in recent years despite the presence of many foreign navies in the region. Multinational naval patrols on the strategic shipping lane linking Europe with Asia via the bustling Gulf of Aden appear to have only led the pirates to expand their offensive operations further into the Indian Ocean. The Security Council of the United Nations (UN) has approved raid operations in Somalia's territorial waters to combat maritime piracy, but warships patrolling the area cannot do much.

The losses experienced by ship companies crossing the Gulf of Aden made these ship companies turn to PMC (Private Military Contractors) to protect ships, cargo and their crew. This can be done in 2 ways, namely: bringing the PMC on board as a guard (on board security) or renting a warship to a ship company. In addition, the Somali government also hired PMC to train its military in dealing with threats that could lead to maritime piracy.

The utilization of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in Somalia has been evident in preceding years. Starting from the year 2000, Puntland, a semi-autonomous region in Somalia, engaged the services of various security contractors, each yielding differing levels of success. In its initial foray, Puntland contracted a British firm named Hart Security from 2000 to 2001. Hart Security's primary mandate was to safeguard marine natural resources by countering illegal foreign fishing activities. This was accomplished through training initiatives and offering assistance aboard Coast Guard vessels. Another entity in this realm is PRS (Physical Risk Solutions), a private security company based in Somaliland and managed by former members of the South African military. In 2010, PRS was enlisted by multiple international organizations and non-governmental entities to provide security services within Somalia, as documented in the Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea in 2012.

One of the most impactful PMCs involved in enhancing Somalia's security stability is Saracen International. In 2010, the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) entered into a contract with Saracen International. This collaboration aimed at imparting military training, distributing military equipment and vehicles, and deploying foreign security personnel in Somalia. This marked the initial phase of one of the most extensive military assistance endeavors in Somalia since the inception of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM), as acknowledged by the United Nations Security Council.

Saracen International, established in the Virgin Islands in 1955, has expanded its footprint over time, establishing offices in South Africa, Uganda, Congo, and Angola. Bill Pelser, the CEO of Saracen International (South Africa) and managing director of Saracen International (Uganda), developed a vested interest in the Puntland region of Somalia in 2005, as noted by the Ministry of Fisheries of Somalia in that year.

2 Literature Review

In investigating this phenomenon, the author employs the framework of non-traditional security, encompassing the roles of pirates and private military companies. Traditionally, security has been predominantly perceived as safeguarding a state's territorial integrity against external threats. Within this perspective, conflicts between nations often relegate security to the mere enhancement of a state's military capabilities to counteract military dangers. Consequently, the state assumes the dual role of both the subject and the object of endeavors aimed at pursuing security interests in accordance with conventional viewpoints. The evolution of the security concept has seen a shift from this conventional framework. Contemporary security concerns encompass a broader spectrum, extending beyond military perils to encompass political, social, economic, and ecological threats. As such, challenges and risks now span a diverse range of domains, reflecting the complexity of non-traditional security issues. [3].

Along with the development of human civilization accompanied by the process of globalization and technological advances, as well as with the various conflicts in the world, the concept of security still does not have a uniform definition and is still being debated until now so that the concept of security has different meanings for different actors. This happens because the concept of security is

getting wider which is driven by increasing interdependence and increasingly complex relations between nations in the era of globalization.

To make it easier to understand the development from traditional security concepts to non-traditional security which is developing dynamically along with globalization that has hit the world, experts also divide security into several dimensions:

- a. *The origin of threats*, where currently the threats do not only come from outside parties, but also from within the country related to primordial issues such as ethnic, cultural, and religious conflicts.
- b. *The nature of threats*, this dimension highlights threats that are military in nature, with security issues that are more comprehensive because they involve other aspects such as the economy, socio-culture, environment, and even other issues such as democratization and human rights along with good developments in the national scope. as well as international.
- c. *Changing responsibility of security*, achieving security does not only depend on the state but is also determined by international cooperation between non-state actors.

Core values of security, namely the focus on security is now not only on 'national independence' but on new values that are developing at the individual and global levels, such as respect for human rights, democratization, protection of the environment and efforts to combat cross border crime (transnational crime)[4].

The next concept used is the concept of pirates. UNCLOS states that maritime piracy is an illegal act carried out on the sea or outside the jurisdiction of any country. If it occurs in the waters of a legal state, then technically it is not an act of piracy but an act of armed robbery or robbery at sea and what is used is the law of that country along the coastline and according to its national security. In the event of maritime piracy, UNCLOS obliges every country to cooperate with all their might in eradicating or suppressing piracy [5].

In accordance with Article 101 of UNCLOS, it can be said that piracy occurs on waters or in other places outside the jurisdiction of any country. If the piracy is carried out by a warship or government ship controlled by a rebel crew, the warship or government ship will be considered a private ship that has carried out the piracy because it will be subject to piracy rules[6].

The next concept used is a private military company. PMC (private military company) is a private company that provides armed forces to do anything related to armed conflict or the military as a service offered. The services offered by the PMC are roughly the same as those offered by the military or police. PMCs are often hired by a government to train or assist the official armed forces in carrying out the duties of the hiring government. PMC is also often hired by a private company to provide protection for the company's staff or buildings and the location of the staff or building is in a conflict area [7].

The growth of PMC numbers in the international world soared after the cold war, it's because many countries involved in the cold war reduced their armed forces. After the cold war, the international world was considered a unipolar world where the United States was the only remaining superpower in the world. The United States' desire to maintain its global military presence is also a major factor why many countries reduce their armed forces numbers [8].

The discourse surrounding whether contractors can be classified as mercenaries is a topic prone to misinterpretation among certain researchers who delve into Private Military Companies (PMCs). While there are certain parallels between the services provided by PMCs and those of traditional

mercenary forces, these similarities do not equate contractors with mercenaries. The distinction becomes evident upon examining the definition of a mercenary as outlined in Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1977. Article 47 of the Geneva Convention sets forth six criteria that collectively characterize an individual as a mercenary combatant or soldier. These criteria serve as the yardstick for determining whether an individual fits the mercenary classification. (Protocols Additional to The Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949). Modern private military companies (PMCs) have evolved in a manner that distinguishes their mercenary activities from definitive legal or political ties to any sponsoring state. Consequently, these private military organizations operate with a profit-driven motive, detached from the broader political affiliations or compatibility of the state that engages their services.

Contemporary security scholars spanning various theoretical disciplines have engaged with the concept of PMCs, often raising pertinent inquiries about their potential impact on international security. However, to date, critics have largely neglected to undertake a comprehensive, cross-theoretical evaluation of PMCs as contributors to international security. A considerable portion of the existing literature tends to exhibit a clear polemical bias, either favoring a particular theory of international security or adopting a general stance of opposition toward PMCs as security actors.

This work aims to bridge this gap by presenting an all-encompassing analysis of the utilization of PMCs and their role in shaping international security.

3 Method and Data Collection

The study employs qualitative research methods to investigate the involvement of Saracen International, a Private Military Company, in addressing the issue of sea piracy within the Gulf of Aden. The primary objective is to comprehend the role played by Saracen International in mitigating piracy incidents in the mentioned region. In pursuit of this goal, a descriptive research method is employed. This research relies on secondary data obtained through an extensive literature review. Various sources such as books, academic journals, articles, reports, and online resources from the internet contribute to the data collection process. These secondary sources provide valuable insights and information pertinent to the subject under examination.

4 Discussion and Result

4.1 Sea Development and Piracy, SCOPUS Trend Analysis

SCOPUS.COM Analyze search results title-abstract-keyword (sea and development and piracy), 153 document results, year range to analyze: 1985 to 2022. Funding sponsor Documents, more than 2, there are first European Commission, Russian Foundation for Basic Research, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Research and Innovation, and Office of Naval Research. There are no Indonesia Funding sponsor.

Affiliation Documents, more than 3, there are first China University of Political Science and Law, followed by Coventry University, Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences. No Indonesia Affiliation.

Country/Territory Documents, more than 3, there are first United Kingdom 28 Documents, followed by United States, Russian Federation, China, France, Australia, South Africa, Italy, Portugal, and South Korea. ASIA by China and South Korea. There is no Indonesia




Fig. 2. SCOPUS Analyze search results title-abstract-keyword (sea and development and piracy), 153 document results, year range to analyze: 1985 to 2022

4.2 Piracy in Gulf Aden

In the early 1980s, prior to the eruption of the civil war in Somalia, the Ministry of Fisheries and the Coastal Development Agency launched a development initiative concentrating on the establishment of agricultural and fisheries cooperatives to aid local fishermen. This program garnered substantial financial support from foreign investors, driven by the recognition of Somalia's abundant and largely untapped marine resources. The Somali fishing industry, marked by considerable potential, became a focal point for investment. However, the current landscape reveals a stark contrast. Numerous individuals are now engaging in piracy, coordinated through pirate networks. This trend is rooted in the presence of a substantial number of impoverished and jobless individuals in Somalia. For them, sea piracy has become a means to swiftly acquire monetary gains.

Several factors contribute to the emergence of piracy as a 'professional occupation' in the mid-1990s. These factors include state failure (statelessness), crimes of opportunity, poverty, illicit

fishing, and the dumping of toxic waste. While each of these elements plays a role in the complex phenomenon of piracy around the Horn of Africa, the key catalyst is the crime of opportunity. The interplay of the other four factors offers an explanation for the acceptance, and sometimes even endorsement, of pirate activities by coastal communities in Somalia [9].

The evolution of piracy from an ad hoc endeavor to a meticulously organized criminal operation was primarily motivated by greed. These opportunistic criminals recognized the potential for hijacking ships and extorting substantial ransoms from shipping companies in exchange for the release of crews and cargo. Consequently, the waters near Somalia became perilous for all vessels, including foreign fishing boats. The frequency of piracy incidents surged dramatically, attracting a significant number of unemployed youths, ultimately transforming piracy into a sophisticated enterprise managed by an intricate criminal network.

The interplay of piracy and state fragility created an environment conducive to the expansion of private security solutions. This synergy led to a robust market for PMC's, catering to a diverse array of clients such as governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations. In Somalia, the privatization of security services was apparent, with both public and private entities engaging security companies to fulfill a myriad of objectives. This trend extended beyond Somalia, with various countries across the Horn of Africa region witnessing the involvement of these private actors.

4.3 Pirates Group in Aden Gulf

Pirate groups predominantly find their bases in villages and small towns along the Somali coastline, including locations like Eyl, Hobyo, and Harardheere. Presently, various pirate clans and militias operate within the Gulf of Aden [10]:

a. Ali Zwahila Group:

Led by clan and militia leader Isse Yulux, the Ali Zwahila Group has experienced significant success. Engaging in intense battles with the Puntland Maritime Police Forces, this group is known for its participation in negotiations involving hijacked ships. It comprises sub-clans such as Ali Saleeban, Osman Mohamoud (a sub-clan of Majerteen), and Layl-kose (a sub-clan of Daarood).

b. Laasqoray Action Group:

The Laasqoray Action Group has emerged after months of preparation and planning. Featuring prominent figures from Hobyo and Puntland Pirate Networks, this group enjoys substantial financial backing from the surrounding community. Its ties extend to the Afwenye (Mohamed Abdi Hassan) militia.

c. Salebaan Clan (Harardheere-Hobyo Network):

Key figures within the Salebaan clan have joined forces to sustain maritime piracy along Central Somalia's coastline. The group secures funding from investors within the clan, particularly Gushaaye. Their actions have shifted back to the sea, targeting merchant vessels traversing the

Indian Ocean. Utilizing Motherships and Socotra Island as bases, this group operates across the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea.

d. Islamic State Faction:

Intelligence reports indicate that the attack on the *Galicia Spirit* on October 25, 2016, was orchestrated by the Islamic State faction in Somalia, also known as ISIS or IS-HOA/EA (Horn of Africa/Eritrea). This faction, led by Abdiqadir Mumin, a former senior al-Shabaab commander who converted to IS, strives to establish the Islamic State in East Africa. Presently operating from Galgala, Puntland, the faction boasts around 300 members.

The areas vulnerable to pirate attacks are demarcated into distinct zones within the expansive Somali waters, covering approximately 2000 nautical miles in length and 380 miles in width along the mainland coastline. Additionally, an area of particular vulnerability lies at the entrance to the Gulf of Aden, spanning 640 miles in length and approximately 50 miles in width. While Socotra Island belongs to Yemen, it hosts a predominantly Somali fishing population. This strategic location potentially allows Somali pirates to monitor sea traffic from various directions—Arab Sea, Somali Waters, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Aden. Informants associated with Yemenis on the island use GPS and UHF radio to provide attackers with information about water conditions, facilitating well-timed assaults.

4.4 Counter-Piracy Operation

The United Nations' counter-piracy effort aimed at addressing the prevailing sea piracy phenomenon in Somalia has faced challenges in effectively curbing the issue. The limitations stem from a combination of factors, including the absence of a comprehensive naval fleet involved and the insufficient control exerted by the Somali government to combat piracy. Despite an escalation in international maritime capabilities within the region, the surge in instances of maritime piracy has not abated.

In 2002, the establishment of a US-led multinational naval task force known as Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150) took place in Bahrain. The purpose of CTF 150 was to monitor, intercept, board, and inspect suspected vessels as part of the broader 'global war on terrorism,' particularly around the Horn of Africa. As the decade progressed, heightened piracy attacks off the coast of Somalia raised significant concern, leading to the initiation of comprehensive international operations in the region. This shift marked the evolution of counter-piracy efforts into a multilateral endeavor.

At present, three distinct international naval task forces operate within the Horn of Africa region:

- a. CTF 150: Focused on maritime security.
- b. EU Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR, Operation Atalanta): Established in 2008 to counter Somali piracy.
- c. CTF 151: Founded in 2009, dedicated exclusively to counter-piracy activities.

Simultaneously, CTF 152, established in 2004, concentrates on maritime security within the Gulf region. While initially oriented toward addressing piracy, the mandates of Operation Atalanta and CTF 151 have expanded to encompass broader maritime security concerns. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted Operation Ocean Shield, a counter-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden, spanning from 2009 to 2016.

To reinforce counter-piracy initiatives, several countries, including Italy, Germany, and Spain, have established military operations within the region. They join France, which has operated from Djibouti since the late 1970s, and the UK, with personnel stationed at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti. Beyond the Horn of Africa, navies from nations like China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Iran, and Australia have consistently deployed naval forces to the Gulf of Aden for counter-piracy endeavors.




Fig. 3. Number of Piracy Attacks 2008-2012

In 2008, there were attacks on 122 ships and in 2009 that number rose to 211 (see figure 1). According to the commander of the Fifth Fleet and Naval Forces Central Command Canada, Bill Gortney, said that companies would not think twice about using the services of a private military company to protect valuable facilities on the high seas. In contrast to Canada, in dealing with the phenomenon of pirates in the Gulf of Aden, the United States, proposed the use of private military company services because United States warships currently cannot be deployed in counter-piracy in the region [11].

The use of private military companies in overcoming the phenomenon of pirates in the Gulf of Aden can also be seen from the Somali side. The Somali government is the best side that should be able to overcome this phenomenon of sea piracy, but Somalia, is typical of a weak state. Somalia has 3 separate governments, the semi-autonomous region of Puntland, which is where the pirate network operates, the TFG (Transitional Federal Government), which is internationally recognized as a government that has jurisdiction over the maritime territory but lacks the capacity to apply it, and a self-governing region. declared independent Somalia. The three used the services of a private military company in their anti-piracy operations. The Somali government uses these services to protect their coastal areas from illegal fishing to waste disposal by ships from neighboring countries. They also use PMC services to train their local strengths in a similar capacity [12] .

According to Statista, the number attacks by piracy in Somali waters fell dramatically from 2010-2015 to 2016-2021, as seen in Table 1.

Table 1. Number of actual and attempted piracy attacks in Somalia 2010-2021

Period of Year	Number of Attacks
2010-2015	358
2016-2021	8

Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/250867/number-of-actual-and-attempted-piracy-attacks-in-somalia/>

4.5 Various role of PMCs in armed conflicts

Private Military Companies (PMCs) are entities or organizations that offer services on an international scale, traditionally performed by national militaries. PMCs operate within the context of both interstate and intrastate armed conflicts, either under the employ of state actors involved in the conflict, non-state actors, or multinational entities seeking security for operations within conflict zones. These contractors often function in substantial groups, leading them to be commonly referred to as 'private military companies' (PMCs). In the media, PMCs are sometimes denoted as 'military firms,' 'military service providers' (MSPs), 'privatized military firms' (PMFs), 'transnational security corporations' (TSCs), or 'security contractors' (SCs).

Existing literature on this subject delineates three primary categories of PMCs: mercenaries, military contractors, and security contractors, based on whether they provide combat services, military training and strategic counsel, or logistics and technical support. Another classification by Peter Singer categorizes PMCs according to their functional capabilities, comprising military provider contractors, consulting contractors, and support contractors. Military provider contractors engage in tactical scenarios, often participating directly in active conflict. Consulting contractors specialize in enhancing capabilities within the client's military or civil defense forces. Support contractors offer a wide array of non-lethal assistance to military forces in the field.

An illustrative example is the Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), which was contracted in the 1990s to manage logistical resources provided by the international community on behalf of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Although classifying PMCs seems straightforward, in practice, these contractors often fulfill roles that span various established categories. Presently, PMCs undertake a wide range of activities, encompassing military operational support, military advice, logistical aid, security services, and crime prevention. Military advice entails training state military forces, including special operations units, covering areas like weaponry, tactics, and force structure. Logistical support encompasses a spectrum of services, from supplying equipment to safeguarding humanitarian assets on the ground and assisting in the reestablishment of public infrastructure. Security services are directed towards the commercial market and involve protecting company assets and personnel. Additionally, crime prevention, also targeted at the commercial sector, encompasses addressing extortion and fraud. Recognizing the expanded roles of PMCs, the current study, however, focuses on the category of PMCs engaged solely in combat functions, predominantly within combat zones [13].

4.6 International Saracen Engagement in Somalia

During the period spanning from May 2010 to February 2011, Saracen International was accused of facilitating a comprehensive military program that encompassed military training, provision of equipment, and deployment of military vehicles to both local military forces and foreign security personnel situated within the Somali region. This initiative, undertaken by Saracen, stands as the most extensive external military endeavor sanctioned by the Somali government subsequent to the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM).

However, due to a lot of pressure being exerted on the project from inside and outside Somalia, in February 2011 Saracen International through its legal counsel terminated all training they provided to PMPF (Puntland Maritime Police Forces) in complying with UN Security Council Resolutions governing the arms embargo.

The UN Monitoring Group, known as the *Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group* (SEMG), has been made aware of instances wherein individuals trained by Saracen International, as well as the vehicles provided by Saracen, have been utilized for security purposes by Puntland officials and for Saracen's humanitarian operations. Saracen teams are also frequently involved in reconnaissance activities and the recruitment of personnel in new operational areas.

In a notable development, on May 19, 2011, the Puntland government formally informed SEMG about the termination of the collaboration between the government and Saracen. This cessation was reportedly mutually agreed upon by both parties. However, on April 20, 2011, a different decision was reached, allowing for the resumption of Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF) training, despite the Puntland government's initial mandate to train anti-piracy forces (PMPF). (Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group, 2011, p. 273)

On October 5, 2010, Lafras Luitingh as CEO of Saracen International South Africa traveled with former CIA member Michael Shanklin and four other Saracen members to Mogadishu to meet government officials who were in Mogadishu. On 17 October 2010, Saracen purchased three Ford F350 type B6 armored cars from the UAE complete with weapons and delivered to Mogadishu on 21 October 2010.

Seeing the increasing activity of the Saracens in Mogadishu, the Commander of AMISOM, Nathan Mughisha, expressed his concerns before the TFG parliament. Seeing Nathan's opinion, the Saracens abandoned their plans in Mogadishu and moved most of their personnel and equipment to the Basaaso area on 29 October 2010 and left some of their humanitarian tokens at the residence of the president of TFG who oversaw renovating the medical clinic for government officials.

At the point when Saracen withdrew its personnel from Mogadishu, its operations in Basaaso were operating with efficiency. Saracen had deployed a force of 1000 members, supported by three transport aircraft, three reconnaissance aircraft, two transport helicopters, and two light combat helicopters. In terms of maritime planning, Saracen had organized for a command and control vessel, along with two logistical support vessels and three rigid-hulled inflatable boats for swift assault operations. If these ambitious plans were successfully realized, Saracen would have emerged as the most well-equipped military force within Somalia.

On October 31, 2010, the MV Noora MOON 1 transported a substantial cargo to the port in Basaaso, comprising 500 pieces of equipment, including construction vehicles and 85 pickup trucks. During the period from October 2010 to February 2011, Saracen chartered a total of fifteen flights to

Somalia from both the UAE and Uganda, utilizing two Antonov An-32 aircraft. The cargo plane, registered under the company Ayk Avia and leased by Saracen for logistical needs, played a crucial role. One of these flights, designated as EK-32604, was apprehended at Hargeysa airport with its crew and two passengers.

Subsequent investigations unveiled that the aircraft, originating from Entebbe and leased through Australian African Global Investment Pty Ltd (AAGI), a company owned by Luitingh, was transporting military equipment weighing 583kg. This cargo consisted of military trousers, combat t-shirts, SWAT combat boots, black battle harnesses, and belts equipped with magazine pouches. These items were intended for the Puntland Development Group (PDG), an entity contracted by Saracen to provide logistical support to local personnel and manage their salaries.

On December 23, 2010, a total of 119 shipping containers left the port of Durban in South Africa aboard the MV Seafarer. This cargo was destined for Saracen's headquarters in Bosaaso, with the journey transiting through the UAE. Documents pertaining to the shipment indicated the involvement of Luitingh-associated logistics companies, including AAGI, as well as UFA Consultant, a South African company owned by Willem Hendrik Pelsler, the CEO of Saracen Uganda. Throughout its voyage, the MV Seafarer was escorted by the MV Eaton, both vessels owned and operated by Afloat Leasing Ltd, a private military company registered in Liberia with offices in Malta.

Between October 2, 2010, and February 17, 2011, Saracen conducted basic military training for 470 soldiers and drivers who were selected by Puntland and PDG authorities. This training encompassed fundamental discipline and weapons usage skills. Furthermore, a substantial portion of trainees underwent five weeks of specialized training, preparing them for roles such as leaders, drivers, signalers, medical teams, and the operation of heavy machine guns (DShk 12.7mm). Although a training plan involving 40mm launcher guns and 82mm mortars was established, it was hindered by the lack of available equipment.

Based on internal Saracen documents obtained by SEMG, the Puntland government aimed to supply Saracen with weaponry, including 195 AK-47 rifles, 74,188 rounds of 7.62 caliber ammunition, 13 PKM light machine-guns with 4,647 rounds of 7.62 caliber ammunition, two 12.7mm heavy machine-guns, and 40mm and 82mm launcher guns. By November 11, 2010, almost all small-caliber weapons had been delivered to Saracen. However, internal Saracen documents indicated that the project manager expressed disappointment regarding the quality of the provided weapons.

Towards late November 2010, Saracen trainees, personnel, and armaments transitioned to operational roles in Puntland. An illustrative instance occurred on November 16, 2010, when four Ford F350 armored vehicles imported from Mogadishu to Bosaaso were observed on the streets of the city. These armored vehicles were reportedly employed as part of the personal security measures for Puntland President Faroole, safeguarding his travels from Bosaaso to Garowe, as per Luitingh.

SEMG also received reports that as many as 85 vehicles imported by Saracen had been handed over to Puntland authorities. Ten of the 85 vehicles were given to Puntland police. Based on aerial photos taken from the Saracen training base, only a few vehicles, including four F350 armored cars, were seen parked inside the base.

In Saracen's role as *military consulting firms*, Saracen assumed the task of training the forerunner of the Puntland Maritime Police Force from 2009 to 2012. Although the legal termination

of the contract between the two parties was agreed in February 2011, Saracen's presence in Somalia is still present with places some of its members as *humanitarian tokens* (Richard, 2010).

In Saracen's role as *military support firms*, it can be seen from previous writings that Saracen has provided logistical assistance such as the purchase of four Ford F350 armored vehicles, 85 logistics vehicles, and basic military goods such as pants, shoes etc., and provided the equipment to the Puntland government.

The military training contract between the Puntland government and the PMC from early 2009 to 2012 was terminated several times due to pressure exerted by the United Nations on the Puntland government, but the PMPF's development in carrying out *anti-piracy* duties is considered one of the factors that has contributed to the decline in the number of maritime piracies in Indonesia. Somalia in 2010-2012. In early 2009, the establishment of the PMPF by the Puntland government with the assistance of Saracen was supported by UNDP and UNODC. With the help of UNDP and UNODC, PMPF has built several new prisons, strengthened the *legal* system and punished 290 people who were indicated as pirates (World Bank Regional Vice-Presidency for Africa, 2013) In 2012, the PMPF conducted military operations against the Eyl pirate headquarters in southern Puntland, including the creation of a small airstrip, water drilling facility and base to support counterpiracy off the coast of Somalia (Mc.Gabe, 2017). Estimated, the decrease in the success rate of pirates decreased by 50% from previous years thanks to the formation of PMPF by Saracen (Powell, 2012).

5 Conclusion

The acquisition of military services by individuals and private firms has taken an unexpected direction, possibly diverging from expectations in earlier years. Due to budgetary considerations, numerous military forces are showing an inclination towards increasingly outsourcing activities that were traditionally conducted in-house.

In response to the piracy phenomenon that occurred in the Gulf of Aden area, the Puntland government hired the services of a PMC named Saracen International in 2009. The purpose of the Puntland government hiring Saracen International was to train the PMPF (Puntland Marine Police Force) in dealing with the problem of maritime piracy in the area. In addition to training, Saracen International also acts as a supplier of PMPF equipment. The relationship between Saracen International and the Puntland government was terminated in 2011, but the contract was resumed in the same year.

The establishment of PMPF by Puntland and Saracen in 2009 received a good response from UNDP and UNODC. The two UN agencies helped PMPF to run the counter-piracy program issued by the Puntland government by providing financial assistance to PMPF.

The funds provided by UNODC are used by PMPF to build new prisons and improve the PMPF legal system so that it can operate within the prescribed legal corridor. In addition, the military operations carried out by PMPF are also considered as one of the biggest factors in reducing piracy activities in the area. The military operations carried out by the PMPF are mostly land-based operations in which the PMPF attacks the bases of the pirates, such as in the city of Eyl.

In a very short time, Saracen International has succeeded in assisting the Puntland government in forming a military unit which is considered to have been successful as one of the factors that reducing the level of attacks by Somali pirates against foreign ships passing through the Gulf of Aden area. The works of Saracen International with PMPF is one of the examples on how the PMC could contribute to International Security.

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