Mapping Financial Stability: Applying SEIR Model and Complex Network Theory to Mitigate Risk Contagion

Tianyang Liu*

*wellington589125@gmail.com

The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Abstract: This study applies complex network theory to financial systems, using a SEIR model to analyze risk spread and the effect of rescue strategies. Key findings include identifying epidemic thresholds that indicate contagion risk and demonstrating that policy interventions can lower this risk. Both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks are examined, showing consistent thresholds. Analysis reveals that stronger rescue efforts lead to lower contagion risk. The model is tested against real data from Chinese and American stock markets, confirming the theory and highlighting how various parameters affect risk distribution. The research supports the development of early warning systems and regulatory improvements for financial stability.

Keywords: Financial Risks, Systemic Risk, Complex Network Theory, SEIR Model, Basic Reproduction Number

1 Introduction

In the rapidly integrating global economy, the intricate web of financial interconnections presents abundant opportunities alongside potential risks. Complex network theory, with its nodes and edges representing the multifaceted interactions within financial systems, offers a powerful lens for scrutinizing these relationships and the propagation of risk. This approach has become increasingly prevalent, depicting market correlations and dynamics with clarity and providing insights into economic development and risk management. As financial crises have demonstrated, the transmission of risk can lead to widespread "mutual loss" across institutions, elevating financial risk prevention to a policy imperative. Addressing the challenges of latent risks within the financial sector requires a nuanced understanding of the system's dynamics. This paper adopts a network perspective, enhancing classic contagion models with a modified SEIR framework for financial risk transmission. By examining both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, it delves into the equilibria's stability and the basic reproduction number. Supported by simulations on empirical and synthetic networks, the research offers theoretical and practical contributions, culminating in a comprehensive summary of findings and their implications for financial stability and policy guidance [1].

BDEDM 2024, January 12-14, Ningbo, People's Republic of China

DOI 10.4108/eai.12-1-2024.2347155

2 Literature Review

The merger of big data and network science has reshaped our understanding of financial risk contagion, using complex network theory to unveil the tightly-knit web of stock, foreign exchange, and futures markets, and how their topology critically impacts financial stability [2]. These networks exhibit scale-free and small-world characteristics, suggesting both the central influence of major institutions and the swift transmission of crises. By adopting epidemiological models like SIR and SIRS, researchers track crisis spread through the financial system, accounting for bank interactions and resilience variations, and highlighting the dual nature of network connectivity in risk management [3]. Empirical studies confirm that bank size and interconnectivity are pivotal in risk propagation, enhancing our grasp of financial networks under duress and guiding systemic risk mitigation tactics [4].

3 SEIR model construction and theoretical analysis

In exploring the propagation of financial risks within networks, analogies to infectious disease models, like the SEIR framework, provide insightful perspectives. Scholars have delineated four discrete states reflecting the risk status of entities within a financial network: Susceptible (S), representing stable entities vulnerable to risks emanating from their high-risk connections; Exposed (E), entities that have encountered risk and, while non-contagious at this juncture, might redistribute their risk burden through network interactions; Infectious (I), entities in high-risk conditions with the capacity to adversely affect associated entities; and Removed (R), entities that have, through superior risk identification and management, insulated themselves from the risk contagion for a transient period [5].

The dynamism of financial network is captured by the transition probabilities among these states. A susceptible entity becomes exposed or infectious upon risk exposure, with probabilities $\alpha\lambda$ and $(1-\alpha\lambda)$, respectively. Exposed entities either revert to the susceptible state at a rate $\beta\phi$, following risk mitigation through internal competencies or external assistance, or progress to the infectious state with a complementary probability $(1-\beta\phi)$. Infectious entities, subsequent to adopting remedial measures, transition to the removed state with probability γ—commonly assumed to be unity, reflecting a full recovery. Removed entities can, however, relapse into susceptibility at a rate δ due to waning immunity or changing factors [6].

The model's parameters are thus: α, the proportion of susceptible entities becoming exposed upon risk contagion; β, the recovery rate of exposed entities; λ, the probability of contagion between susceptible and infectious entities; ϕ, the average rate of transition from exposed to susceptible state, an inverse function of the latency period; γ, the recovery rate transitioning infectious entities to removed status; δ, the proportion of the removed reverting to susceptibility [7].

By adopting this epidemiological paradigm, we advance our understanding of systemic risk within financial ecosystems, endorsing both homogeneity and heterogeneity across network structures. Such an approach invites further interdisciplinary research to refine these models and, crucially, embeds them within the more expansive tapestry of behavioral finance, institutional reactions, and evolving regulatory landscapes that continue to shape the risk profiles of financial networks globally.



Figure 1. SEIR risk communication model.

3.1. SEIR model based on homogeneous network

In the context of financial risk contagion, the SEIR model on a homogeneous network serves as a framework to simulate and analyze the spread of financial crises. A homogeneous network assumes that financial entities are connected in a similar fashion—having an equal probability of interacting with or transferring risk to each other.

In the SEIR model in Figure1, entities within the network are categorized into four distinct states:

S(t): Susceptible entities that are operating normally without exposure to risk but could potentially be exposed. E(t): Exposed entities that have been exposed to the risk but are not yet manifesting symptoms. I(t): Infectious entities that are currently experiencing risk symptoms and are capable of transmitting risk to other entities. R(t): Removed entities that have recovered from the risk state and are no longer transmitting risk. The transitions between these states can be described by a set of differential equations, which form the basis of the SEIR model. Here's an example of a simplified set of equations for the SEIR model:

$$\frac{dS(t)}{dt} = -\beta S(t)I(t)$$

$$\frac{dE(t)}{dt} = \beta S(t)I(t) - \sigma E(t)$$

$$\frac{dI(t)}{dt} = \sigma E(t) - \gamma I(t)$$

$$\frac{dR(t)}{dt} = \gamma I(t)$$

Where:

β is the effective contact rate, representing the rate at which susceptible entities become exposed. σ is the rate at which exposed entities become infectious. γ is the recovery rate at which infectious entities become removed.

Additional parameters can be introduced into the model to simulate the nuances of financial networks, such as the connectivity of the network, the strength of interactions between entities, and the impacts of market dynamics and regulatory policies.

Numerical simulations of these equations can demonstrate how financial risk propagates through the network under various conditions. Such modeling helps to understand the dynamics of risk transmission under different market conditions and policy interventions and provides theoretical support for financial regulation and risk management strategies.

3.2. SEIR model based on heterogeneous network

Considering the scale-free characteristics of real-world financial networks, where some entities (nodes) have a significantly higher number of connections (degrees), we can adapt the SEIR model to account for the heterogeneity in node degrees. In a scale-free network, the probability that a node connects to

k other nodes follow a power-law distribution, which means that most nodes have few connections, while a few nodes have many connections (hubs) [8].

To model the financial risk contagion in such a heterogeneous network, we classify the entities based on their degree k. Let $S_k(t)$, $E_k(t)$, $I_k(t)$, $R_k(t)$ represent the relative densities of normal, exposed, infectious, and removed entities with degree k at time t, respectively. For each degree k, the densities satisfy the conservation equation:

$$S_k(t) + E_k(t) + I_k(t) + R_k(t) = 1$$

The dynamical equations for the financial risk contagion in a heterogeneous network can then be formulated as follows:

$$\frac{dS_k(t)}{dt} = -\beta_k S_k(t) \sum_{k'} P\,(k'|k) I_{k'}(t)$$

$$\frac{dE_k(t)}{dt} = \beta_k S_k(t) \sum_{k'} P\,(k'|k) I_{k'}(t) - \sigma_K E_k(t)$$

$$\frac{dI_k(t)}{dt} = \sigma_K E_k(t) - \gamma_K E_k(t)$$

$$\frac{dR_k(t)}{dt} = \gamma_K I_k(t)$$

β_k represents the effective contact rate for nodes of degree k. σ_k is the rate at which exposed nodes of degree k become infectious. γ_k is the recovery rate for infectious nodes of degree k. $P(k' \mid k)$ is the conditional probability that a node of degree k is connected to a node of degree k'

These equations consider the heterogeneity of the network by incorporating the degree-based classification of nodes. They allow us to explore how financial risk contagion spreads across nodes with different levels of connectivity and how hubs can disproportionately influence the overall dynamics of the system.

By solving these equations numerically, we can analyze the behavior of the system over time and identify critical thresholds or tipping points where a small change in the system's parameters could lead to a large-scale financial crisis. This heterogeneous network approach provides a more realistic representation of financial systems and can inform more effective risk management and mitigation strategies.

4 Simulation

The dataset utilized for this study is derived from the Wind database, with a collection date of August 10, 2021. It encompasses daily closing price data for financial stocks from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets and the United States stock market for the years 2008, 2018, and 2020. To ensure the quality and completeness of the data, financial institutions with substantial missing data were omitted from the dataset [9]. The final dataset includes data for 52 institutions over 246 effective trading days in 2008, 94 institutions over 243 effective trading days in 2018, and 116 institutions over 243 effective trading days in 2020 from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets. For the US stock market, the data comprises 445 institutions over 238 effective trading days in 2008, 651 institutions over 235 effective trading days in 2018, and 52 institutions over 779 effective trading days in 2020. The daily closing price data was processed as follows: for stock *i* on trading day *t*, the price return rate $r_i\ (t)$ was calculated using the natural logarithm of the closing price $P_i\ (t)$, such that $r_i\ (t) = In\ P_i\ (t) - In\ P_i\ (t\text{-}1)$. This formula calculates the log return, capturing the percentage change in price between consecutive days, which is commonly used in financial analysis due to its desirable statistical properties.

The below figure2 shows that over the past three years, the presence of financial institutions within the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets has been significantly lower compared to the density of such entities in the U.S. stock market. Concurrently, interconnectivity among the existing financial institutions in these Chinese markets has intensified, leading to a more rapid dissemination of risks throughout the financial network [10].



Figure 2. Structure diagram of various financial networks.

5 Conclusion

In summary, this study enhances my understanding of financial risk contagion by using complex network theory and adapting the SEIR model to finance. It identifies key thresholds in both uniform and diverse financial networks that signal risk spread potential. The study finds that prompt policy interventions can effectively reduce systemic risk, as highlighted by the inverse relationship between rescue measures and the basic reproduction number. Practical tests using data from Chinese and American stock markets validate the model's relevance. This research illustrates how financial entities are interlinked and their differential impacts on network stability, thus informing the speed and reach of risk contagion. The study proposes a comprehensive framework for forecasting and managing financial risks, suggesting improved risk monitoring and regulatory policies for safeguarding global financial health. Incorporating this advanced network analysis into risk management could better equip us to avert financial crises and safeguard economic systems worldwide.

References

[1] Zhang, Mengyao, et al. "Complex-network-based traffic network analysis and dynamics: A comprehensive review." Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications (2022): 128063.

[2] Li, Guijun, et al. "Analysis of the terrorist organization alliance network based on complex network theory." IEEE Access 7 (2019): 103854-103862.

[3] González, Salvador Hernández, and Idalia Flores De La Mota. "Applying complex network theory to the analysis of Mexico City metro network (1969–2018)." Case Studies on Transport Policy 9.3 (2021): 1344-1357.

[4] Berger, David, et al. "Testing and reopening in an SEIR model." Review of Economic Dynamics 43 (2022): 1-21.

[5] Godio, Alberto, Francesca Pace, and Andrea Vergnano. "SEIR modeling of the Italian epidemic of SARS-CoV-2 using computational swarm intelligence." International journal of environmental research and public health 17.10 (2020): 3535.

[6] Billah, Md Arif, Md Mamun Miah, and Md Nuruzzaman Khan. "Reproductive number of coronavirus: A systematic review and meta-analysis based on global level evidence." PloS one 15.11 (2020): e0242128.

[7] Kou, Gang, et al. "Machine learning methods for systemic risk analysis in financial sectors." (2019).

[8] Brunnermeier, Markus K., Gang Nathan Dong, and Darius Palia. "Banks' noninterest income and systemic risk." The Review of Corporate Finance Studies 9.2 (2020): 229-255.

[9] Widagdo, Bambang, et al. "Financial Ratio, Macro Economy, and Investment Risk on Sharia Stock Return." The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business 7.12 (2020): 919-926.

[10] Rai, Kamini, Shikha Dua, and Miklesh Yadav. "Association of financial attitude, financial behaviour and financial knowledge towards financial literacy: A structural equation modeling approach." FIIB Business Review 8.1 (2019): 51-60.