

# Fingerprint Recognition with Embedded Cameras on Mobile Phones

Mohammad Omar Derawi, Bian Yang, and Christoph Busch

Norwegian Information Security Laboratory, Gjøvik University College, Norway  
{mohammad.derawi,bian.yang,christoph.busch}@hig.no  
<http://www.nislab.no/>

**Abstract.** Mobile phones with a camera function are capable of capturing image and processing tasks. Fingerprint recognition has been used in many different applications where high security is required. A first step towards a novel biometric authentication approach applying cell phone cameras capturing fingerprint images as biometric traits is proposed. The proposed method is evaluated using 1320 fingerprint images from each embedded capturing device. Fingerprints are collected by a Nokia N95 and a HTC Desire. The overall results of this approach show a biometric performance with an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 4.5% by applying a commercial extractor/comparator and without any preprocessing on the images.

**Keywords:** biometric systems, fingerprint recognition, mobile phone cameras, user authentication.

## 1 Introduction

Current mobile devices implement various new kinds of applications such as taking photos, and movie shooting by using embedded camera devices. This progress was made possible by the evolution of miniaturized embedded camera technology. Mobile devices – particularly mobile phones – are being found in almost everyone’s hip pocket these days all over the world. Almost all newer cell phones now-a-days have embedded camera devices, and some of those have more than over 5 mega-pixel image cameras.

From a security point of view, the issues related to ever-present mobile devices are becoming critical, since the stored information in them (names, addresses, messages, pictures and future plans stored in a user calendar) has a significant personal value. Moreover, the services which can be accessed via mobile devices (e.g., m-banking and m-commerce, e-mails etc.) represent a major value. Therefore, the danger of a mobile device ending up in the wrong hands presents a serious threat to information security and user privacy. According to the latest research from Halifax Home Insurance claims, 390 million British pounds a year is lost in Britain due to the theft of mobile phones. With the average handset costing more than 100 British pounds, it is perhaps not surprising that there are more than 2 million stolen in the UK every year [1].

Authentication is an area which has grown over the last decades, and will continue to grow in the future. It is used in many places today and being authenticated has become a daily habit for most people. Examples of this are PIN code to your banking card, password to get access to a computer and passport used at border control. We identify friends and family by their face, voice, how they walk, etc. As we realize there are different ways in which a user can be authenticated, but all these methods can be categorized into one of three classes [2]. The first is *something you know* (e.g., a password), the second is *something you have* (e.g., a token) and the third is *something you are* (e.g., a biometric property).

Unlike passwords, PINs, tokens etc. biometric characteristics cannot be stolen or forgotten. The use of biometric was first known in the 14th century in China where "Chinese merchants were stamping childrens palm- and foot prints on paper with ink in order to distinguish young children from one another". Approximately after 500 years has passed, the first fingerprinting was used for identification of persons. In 1892, the Argentineans developed an identification system when a woman was found guilty of a murder after the investigation police proved that the blood of the womans finger on the crime scene was hers. The main advantage of biometric authentication is that it establishes an explicit link to the identity because biometrics use human *biological* and *behavioral* characteristics. The first mentioned are the biometrics derived directly from the part of a human body. The most used and prominent examples are the fingerprint, face, iris and hand recognition. The behavioral characteristics are the biometrics by persons behavioral characteristics, such as gait-recognition, keystroke recognition, speech/voice recognition and etc.

Many fingerprint recognition algorithms perform well on databases that had been collected with high-resolution cameras and in highly controlled situations [3]. Recent publications show that the performance of a baseline system deteriorates from Equal Error Rate (EER) around 0.02 % with very high quality images to  $EER = 25$  % due to low qualities images [4]. Thus active research is still going on to improve the recognition performance. In applications such as fingerprint authentication using cameras in cell phones and PDAs, the cameras may introduce image distortions (e.g., because of fish-eye lenses), and fingerprint images may exhibit a wide range of illumination conditions, as well as scale and pose variations. An important question is which of the fingerprint authentication algorithms will work well with fingerprint images produced by cell phone cameras?

However, recent research [5,6] have shown that by using low-cost webcam devices it is possible to extract fingerprint information when applying different pre-processing and image enhancements approaches. In this paper we present fingerprint recognition as means of verifying the identity of the user of a mobile phone. The main purpose of this paper is to study how it is possible to lower down the user effort while keeping the error rates in an acceptable and practical range. Therefore, this proposal is a realistic approach to be implemented in mobile devices for user authentication. To address this issue, we collected a


fingerprint database at the Norwegian Information Security Laboratory using two different cell phone cameras, namely the Nokia N95 and HTC Desire where details mentioned later.

## 2 Fingerprint Recognition

Fingerprint recognition is the most matured approach among all the biometric techniques ever discovered. With its success of use in different applications, it is today used in many access controls applications as each individual has an immutable, unique fingerprint. The hand skin or the finger skin consists of the so called friction ridges with pores. The ridges are already created in the ninth week of an individuals fetal development life [7], and remains the same all life long, only growing up to adult size, but if severe injuries occur the skin may be reconstructed the same as before. Researchers have found out that identical twins have fingerprints that are quite different and that in the forensic community it is believed that no two people have the same fingerprint [8].

Many capture device technologies have been developed over the last decades replacing the old ink imaging process. The old process was based on sensing ridges on an individuals finger with ink, where newer technologies uses a scanner placing the surface of the finger onto this device. Such technologies are referred to as live-scan and based on four techniques [9]:

***Frustrated total internal reflection (FTR) and optical methods*** is a first live scan technology. Figure 1 illustrates, how the reflected signal is acquired by a camera from the underside of a prism when a finger touches the top of the prism. The typical image acquisition surface of 1 inch by 1 inch is converted to 500 dots per inch (DPI) using either charge coupled device (CCD) or complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) camera.



**Fig. 1.** Optical fingerprint sensing by frustrated total internal reflection

**CMOS Capacitance.** The ridges and valleys create different charge accumulations, when a finger hits a CMOS chip grid. This charge is converted to an intensity value of a pixel using various competing techniques such as alternating current (AC), direct current (DC) and radio frequency (RF). The typical image acquisition surface of 0.5 inch by 0.5 inch is converted to 500 dots per inch (DPI). The resultant images also have a propensity to be affected by the skin dryness and wetness.

**Ultrasound Sensing.** The thermal sensor is developed by using pyro-electric material, which measures temperature changes due to the ridge-valley structure as the finger is swiped over the scanner and produces an image. In this case the skin is a better thermal conductor than air and thus contact with the ridges causes a noticeable temperature drop on a heated surface. This technology is claimed to overcome the dryness and wetness of the skin issues of optical scanners. But the resulting images are not affluent in gray value images. The thermal sensor is becoming more popular today, because they are small and of low cost. Swipe sensors based on optical and CMOS technology are also available as commercial products.

### 3 Data Collection

#### 3.1 Rationale

Besides fingerprint recognition systems deployed for applications with high-security requirements such as border control [10,11] and forensics [12], fingerprint recognition is supposed to be promising for consumer markets as well for many years [13,14]. In the meanwhile, privacy concerns over fingerprint recognition technologies' deployment in non-high-security applications have been raised [15,16] and thus leads to a refrained development of biometrics in consumer market in recent years compared with the rapid development in the public sectors such as border control, critical infrastructure's access control, and crime investigations.

We suppose there are at least two ways to alleviating these privacy concerns. Biometric template protection [17,18] is one of the most promising solutions to provide a positive-sum of both performance and privacy for biometric systems' users. The European Research Project TURBINE [19] demonstrated a good result in both performance and privacy of the ISO fingerprint minutiae template based privacy-enhancement biometric solutions. On the other hand, for the consumer market, we think using customers' own biometric sensors will also help alleviate the customers' privacy concerns. That is the motivation of this paper to try using cell phone cameras as sensors for fingerprint sample collection.

Obviously, for applications requiring high security, subjects' own biometric sensors may not be suitable for data collection unless the cell phone can be authenticated as a registered and un-tampered device in both software and hardware aspects, which is difficult to realize for a normal consumer electronics that is out of the control of the inspection party. However for consumer market, cell phone can be deemed nowadays as a secure device accepted by many customers,

e.g, many banking services send transaction password, TAN code or PIN code via SMS to customers' cell phone. So in this paper we assume biometric data collection by the customers' cell phone cameras will not raise more privacy and security concerns to the customers than the cell phone based banking services.

In the meanwhile we expect technical challenges in quality control to the cell phone camera captured samples, especially from the sample image processing aspects such as bias lighting conditions and unstable sample collection environment caused by hand-holding. In addition, most existing cell phone cameras are not designed for biometric use and accurate focusing will always be a challenge for fingerprint image capturing. We address these potential challenges in this paper in a simplified way to investigate whether cell phone camera can generate good quality samples and corresponding good biometric performance in a relative stable data collection environment.

### 3.2 Data Collection Steps

As there is no standard benchmark database available for fingerprint images captured by digital camera, we constructed an independent database. The image database is comprised of 22 subjects from which fingerprint images were taken with a cell phone camera. The fingerprint data used in this paper are captured by two commercial sensors as shown in Figure 2. The cell cameras used were




**Fig. 2.** Left: CMOS Sensor (HTC Desire), Right: CMOS Sensor (Nokia N90) and a cropped/contrasted fingerprint image from each cell, at the same scale factor

Carl Zeiss Optics from Nokia N95 and HTC Desires' embedded camera. Further detailed information of the sensors is described in Table 1.

The constructed independent database comprises of 1320 fingerprint images. These images stem from 220 finger instances, where each instance was captured 6 times. The images are stored in the internal memory of the phones and all the

**Table 1.** Cell phone camera setting for fingerprint image acquisition


Cell Phone	Nokia N95	HTC Desire
Lens Type	CMOS, Tessar lens	CMOS
Mega Pixel	5.0	5.0
Resolution	2592x1944	2592x1552
Flash	LED Flash	LED Flash
ISO Speed	100 - 800	52
Auto-Focus	Yes	Yes

**Fig. 3.** Setup for the Nokia N95 capture device

images were collected in the cameras "Burst Mode". For evaluating the performance of various algorithms under different settings, the Nokia N95 was fixed placed on a hanger as illustrated in Figure 3 where images were taken by a human operator holding the phone and capturing images for the HTC Desire. The image capture was performed inside a laboratory with normal lighting conditions.

## 4 Evaluation

As can be seen in Figure 4, the user initially presents its biometric characteristic (i.e., capturing the fingerprint) to the sensor equipment (i.e. camera in a mobile phone), which captures it as captured biometric sample. After preprocessing this captured sample, features will be extracted from the sample. In case of fingerprint biometrics, these features would typically be minutia points. The extracted features can then be used for comparison against corresponding features stored in a database, based on the claimed identity of the user. The result of the comparison is called the *similarity score*  $S$ , where a low value of  $S$  indicates little similarity, while a high value indicates high similarity. The last step is to compare the similarity score  $S$  to a predefined system *threshold*  $T$ , and output a decision based on both values. In case the similarity score is above the threshold ( $S > T$ ) then the user is accepted as genuine, while a similarity score below the threshold ( $S < T$ ) indicates an impostor who is rejected by the



**Fig. 4.** A traditional verification process

system. Obviously the biometric features of the user must initially be stored in the database before any comparison of a probe feature vector can take place. This is done during the *enrolment phase*. During the enrolment biometric samples are captured from the biometric characteristic, after which it is processed and features are extracted. The extracted data is now stored in a database and linked to the identity of the user who enrolled. The stored data in the database is referred to as the *reference template* of the user. In case of fingerprint biometrics it is a common approach to derive the features from multiple captured samples and generate a single minutiae template.

#### 4.1 Feature Extraction

In order to measure the sensor performance we have applied the Neurotechnology, Verifinger 6.0 Extended SDK commercial minutiae extractor for the feature extraction. The SDK includes functionality to extract a set of minutiae data from an individual fingerprint image and to compute a comparison-score by comparing one set of minutiae data with another. Both SDKs support open and interoperable systems as the generated minutiae templates can be stored according to the ISO or ANSI interchange standard.

#### 4.2 Feature Comparison

We compared the verification results of the Neurotechnology algorithm on the processed images. For each algorithm the error rates were determined based on a threshold separating genuine and impostor scores. The False Match Rate (FMR) and False Non-Match Rate (FNMR) were calculated. The calculation of FMR and FNMR is done in the following way. We have collected  $N$  data samples from each of  $M$  participants, then we have calculated similarity scores between two samples, either stemming from one finger instance or from two different instances. A similarity score between two samples from the same source is called

a genuine score, while an impostor score is the similarity score between two samples from different instances. Given our setting, we can have  $N * M$  data samples from which we can calculate the total number of  $N_{Gen} = \frac{M*N*(N-1)}{2}$  different genuine scores and  $N_{Imp} = \frac{M*N*(M-1)*N}{2}$ . Given these sets of genuine and impostor scores we can calculate FMR and FNMR for any given threshold  $T$  as follows:

$$FMR(T) = \frac{\text{Number of incorrectly accepted impostor images} \geq T}{\text{Total number of impostor images}} \quad (1)$$

$$FNMR(T) = \frac{\text{Number of incorrectly rejected genuine images} < T}{\text{Total number of genuine images}} \quad (2)$$

From this, we can find the point where FNMR equals FMR, or in other words the Equal Error Rate (EER). This rate is very common used value which is being used to compare different systems against each other, and it roughly gives an idea of how well a system performs.

The images that were generated with the mobile phones encode the finger position according to Table 2 and the equal error rates retrieved corresponding to the finger codes are overviewed in Table 3

**Table 2.** Finger position codes according to ISO 19794-2

Finger Position	Code
Right thumb	1
Right index finger	2
Right middle finger	3
Right ring finger	4
Right little finger	5
Left thumb	6
Left index finger	7
Left middle finger	8
Left ring finger	9
Left little finger	10

**Table 3.** EERs of cell phone fingerprint recognition. Numbers are in percentage

Cell Phone	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	all
Nokia N95:	5.77	5.92	5.11	7.36	5.43	2.98	0.0	0.43	6.26	5.45	4.66
HTC Desire:	11.73	11.43	23.62	21.17	16.01	10.98	8.47	15.37	16.11	15.96	14.65



In general we see that the left index finger (code 7) has performed best for both phones with EER of 0.0% and 8.47%. The overall performance (cross comparison of all ten fingers) which can be seen in column *all* for Nokia N95 performs significantly better than the Desire. This is so because of various reasons. The Nokia was placed in fixed way on the holder while capturing. Furthermore, the Nokia was set to an internal close-up mode setting. This mode is ideal for capturing details of small objects within a distance between 10 and 60 cm. Here we had to ensure that the auto-focus always resulted in better quality images at a small distance when capturing the fingerprints, whereas the HTC was manually adjusted by the human operator. Thus, this means that the Nokia N95's auto-focus was performing slightly better than the HTC Desire.

## 5 Discussion

Since personal mobile devices at present time only offer means for explicit user authentication, this authentication usually takes place one time; only when the mobile device has been switched on. After that the device will function for a long time without shielding user privacy. As of today the majority of Internet users are expecting a transparent transition of services from the wired to the wireless mobile world. As personal mobile devices such as Apple's iPhone, T-Mobile's G1 or Nokia's S60 become more popular the ordinary user is expecting and using the full range of Internet services in the mobile Internet, since former limitations with regard to screen size and interaction capabilities (zooming, "copy and paste" functionality etc.) disappeared recently. In fact many users are even extending their expectations from their home and office environment, as they enjoy typical mobile features, such as location-based services, which are supported by widespread GPS-features.

On the contrary users tend to ignore the risks, which they accept while operating Internet services from their mobile device. Not only sensitive information is accessible from the mobile device but also transactions on the stock market and other critical services, which grant access to financial assets. At the same time mobile devices are more exposed to the public and thus there is likelihood that a mobile device is lost or stolen in an unattended moment. This threat is shown by the number of approx. 10.000 mobile phones, which were left in London taxis every month in 2008 [20].

It is obvious that a mobile Internet can only exist, if there is a strong link between the mobile device and the authorized user of that specific device. This requires that proper access control mechanisms are in place, to control that the registered user and only the registered user operates the mobile device. Unfortunately most mobile devices are operated today with knowledge-based access control only, which is widely deactivated due to the associated inconvenience.

A promising way out of these pressing problems is to implement on mobile devices secure biometric access control mechanisms, which provide a non-reputable approach based on the observation of biological characteristics (i.e. the fingerprint) of the registered user. The aim of a biometric access control process is, to determine whether the biometric characteristic of the interacting subject and the previously recorded representation in the reference data match.

A possible application scenario of a the fingerprint biometric user verification system in a mobile device could be as follows; When a device such as a mobile phone, is first taken into use it would enter a “practicing” learning mode where the high quality fingerprints data are processed and stored. Password-based or PIN code user authentication would be used during the learning session. If the solidity fingerprint biometrics was sufficient enough, the system would go into a biometric authentication “state”, a state that will need confirmation from the owner. In this state the system would asynchronously verify the owner’s identity every time the owner wanted to authenticate.

## 6 Conclusion

The cell phone camera database has been used to study the performance of some fingerprint verification algorithms in a first step towards real-life situations. The database has scaled and posed distortions in addition to illumination. The camera lens’ cause further distortion in the images with changes in orientation.

The novel biometric method for frequent authentication of users of mobile devices proposed in this paper was investigated in a technology test. It contained fingerprints data. The recognition resulted in different performances of using one minutia extractor and comparator. The best algorithm performance gained resulted in an EER of 4.66.% for the Nokia N95. Looking forward into which finger was performing best, then we observe an EER of 0.0% for the left index finger as well.

The shown results suggest the possibility of using the proposed method for protecting personal devices such as PDAs, smart suitcases, mobile phones etc. In a future of truly pervasive computing, when small and inexpensive hardware can be embedded in various objects, this method could also be used for protecting valuable personal items. Moreover, reliably authenticated mobile devices may also serve as an automated authentication in relation to other systems such as access control system or automated external system logon.

**Acknowledgments.** We would like to thank Simon McCallum and Jayson David Mackie for using their cell phones for the experiment. Furthermore, we would like to thank all volunteers participating in the data collection.

## References

1. Mobile phone theft increasing across the uk,  
<http://www.insure4u.info/home-insurance-mobile/mobile-phone-theft-increasing-across-the-uk.html>  
 (accessed March 30, 2011)
2. Shah, S.U., Fazl e Hadi, Minhas, A.A.: New factor of authentication: Something you process. In: International Conference on Future Computer and Communication, pp. 102–106 (2009)
3. Nist image group’s fingerprint research,  
<http://www.itl.nist.gov/iad/894.03/fing/fing.html> (accessed February 13, 2011)
4. Gafurov, D., Bours, P., Yang, B., Busch, C.: Guc100 multi-scanner fingerprint database for in-house (semi-public) performance and interoperability evaluation. In: International Conference on Computational Science and its Applications, pp. 303–306 (2010)
5. Mueller, R., Sanchez-Reillo, R.: An approach to biometric identity management using low cost equipment. In: International Conference on Intelligent Information Hiding and Multimedia Signal Processing, pp. 1096–1100 (2009)
6. Hiew, B.Y., Teoh, A.B.J., Yin, O.S.: A secure digital camera based fingerprint verification system. *J. Vis. Comun. Image Represent.* 21, 219–231 (2010)
7. Fetal development, <http://www.pregnancy.org/fetaldevelopment> (accessed February 13, 2011)
8. Pankanti, S., Prabhakar, S., Jain, A.K.: On the individuality of fingerprints. *IEEE Trans. Pattern Anal. Mach. Intell.* 24, 1010–1025 (2002)
9. Bolle, R., Connell, J., Pankanti, S., Ratha, N., Senior, A.: *Guide to Biometrics*. Springer (2003)
10. Safety & security of u.s. borders: Biometrics,  
[http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info\\_1336.html](http://travel.state.gov/visa/immigrants/info/info_1336.html) (accessed February 13, 2011)
11. 2004/512/ec: Council decision of 8 june 2004 establishing the visa information system (vis), <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004D0512:EN:NOT> (accessed February 13, 2011)
12. Method for fingerprint identification,  
<http://www.interpol.int/public/Forensic/fingerprints/WorkingParties/IEEGFI/ieegfi.asp> (accessed February 13, 2011)
13. Fingerprint payment heads for the uk,  
<http://www.talkingretail.com/news/industry-news/fingerprint-payment-heads-for-the-uk> (accessed February 13, 2011)
14. Fingerprint biometric retail pos systems on show,  
[http://www.prosecurityzone.com/News/Biometrics/Fingerprint\\_recognition/Fingerprint\\_biometric\\_retail\\_pos\\_systems\\_on\\_show\\_16250.asp#axzz1Dr8cNs0u](http://www.prosecurityzone.com/News/Biometrics/Fingerprint_recognition/Fingerprint_biometric_retail_pos_systems_on_show_16250.asp#axzz1Dr8cNs0u) (accessed February 13, 2011)
15. Retailers fingerprint plans prompt privacy concerns,  
<http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/1826631/retailers-fingerprint-plans-prompt-privacy-concerns>  
 (accessed February 13, 2011)

16. Europe tells Britain to justify itself over fingerprinting children in schools, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8202076/Europe-tells-Britain-to-justify-itself-over-fingerprinting-children-in-schools.html> (accessed February 13, 2011)
17. Jain, A.K., Nandakumar, K., Nagar, A.: Biometric template security. EURASIP J. Adv. Signal Process, 113:1–113:17 (January 2008)
18. ISO/IEC FDIS 24745 Information technology – Security techniques – Biometric information protection, FDIS (February 2011)
19. Eu fp7 integrated project - trusted revocable biometric identities, <http://www.turbine-project.org/> (accessed February 13, 2011)
20. Security park: 60,000 mobile phones left in London taxis in the last six months, [http://www.securitypark.co.uk/security\\_article262056.html](http://www.securitypark.co.uk/security_article262056.html) (accessed February 13, 2011)