VALUETOOLS 2008
INTER-PERF 2008WNS2 2008MODENETS 2008GAMECOMM 2008SMCTOOLS 2008

    GAMECOMM

    2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

    Welcome to Athens! On behalf of the whole organizing team, we wholeheartedly welcome you to the third installment of Valuetools, Valuetools 2008. The first two installments took place in Pisa (2006) and Nantes (2007). So, again, the conference is taking place in a city of rich cultural heritage. We…

    Welcome to Athens! On behalf of the whole organizing team, we wholeheartedly welcome you to the third installment of Valuetools, Valuetools 2008. The first two installments took place in Pisa (2006) and Nantes (2007). So, again, the conference is taking place in a city of rich cultural heritage. We look forward to emulating the previous two installments also in terms of their scientific success. The motivation behind Valuetools is the observation that an impressive range of methodologies and tools have been developed recently for the purpose of performance evaluation, across many disparate research fields. Valuetools is meant to be a forum that will allow researchers to compare and debate the full range of these tools and methodologies, and in addition promote the interdisciplinary flow of technical information.

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    Editor(s): John Baras and Costas Courcoubetis
    Publisher
    ICST
    ISBN
    978-963-9799-31-8
    Conference dates
    20th Oct 2008
    Location
    Athens, Greece
    Appeared in EUDL
    29th Nov 2011
    Appears in
    ACM Digital Library

    Copyright © 2011–2013 ICST

    • Introducing Hierarchy in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games

      Research Article in 2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

      Yezekael Hayel, Samson Lasaulce, Rachid El-Azouzi, Merouane Debbah

      Abstract
      We consider a multiple access channel where the users choose their best power control strategy in order to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. To increase the utilities with respect to the cl…We consider a multiple access channel where the users choose their best power control strategy in order to selfishly maximize their energy-efficiency. To increase the utilities with respect to the classical non-cooperative game, we introduce hierarchy in two ways. On the one hand, assuming single-user decoding at the receiver, we investigate a Stackelberg formulation of the game where one user is the leader. On the other hand, assuming neither leader nor followers among the users, we introduce hierarchy by using successive interference cancellation at the receiver. For both cases, we study the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium and compare the individual performance obtained in the hierarchical game with that obtained in the non-cooperative game. An exhaustive comparative analysis of the two games is also conducted. In order to optimize the choice of the leader in the Stackelberg formulation (with single user decoding) and that of the decoding order (in the non-cooperative game with successive interference cancelation), we study two measures of global energy-efficiency for the network and discussions are provided for each case.
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    • Towards a Game Theoretic Formulation of Clustering Routing in Wireless Sensor Networks

      Research Article in 2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

      Georgios Koltsidas, Fotini-Niovi Pavlidou

      Abstract
      Despite its long history, only recently game theory has been used to model routing and packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. However, the clustering problem has not been studied u…Despite its long history, only recently game theory has been used to model routing and packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. However, the clustering problem has not been studied under this framework in detail. In this work our objective is to provide a game theoretical modeling of clustering routing for sensor networks. The analysis is based on a non-cooperative game approach where each sensor behaves selfishly in order to conserve its energy and thus maximize its lifespan. We prove the Nash Equilibria of the game for pure and mixed strategies and use them to formulate a clustering mechanism (which we called Clustered Routing for Selfish Sensors - CROSS), that can be applied to realistic networks. Comparing this mechanism to a popular clustering technique, we show via simulations that CROSS outperforms LEACH in most cases in terms of network lifetime, a crucial parameter for sensor networks.
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    • Reservation-Based Distributed Medium Access in Wireless Collision Channels

      Research Article in 2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

      Ishai Menache, Nahum Shimkin

      Abstract
      We consider an uplink wireless collision channel, shared by multiple mobile users. As part of the medium access protocol, channel reservation is carried out by using request-to-send (RTS) and clear-t…We consider an uplink wireless collision channel, shared by multiple mobile users. As part of the medium access protocol, channel reservation is carried out by using request-to-send (RTS) and clear-to-send (CTS) control packets. Consequently, collisions are reduced to the relatively short periods where mobiles request channel use. In our model, users are free to schedule their individual channel requests, while the objective of each user is to minimize its own power investment subject to a minimum-throughput demand. Our analysis reveals that for feasible throughput demands, there exist exactly two Nash equilibrium points in stationary strategies, with one being superior to the other uniformly for all users. We then show how this better equilibrium point can be obtained through a distributed mechanism. Finally, we discuss the optimal design of the reservation periods, while considering capacity, power and delay tradeoffs.
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    • A Lyapunov-Krasovskii Stability Analysis for Game-Theoretic Based Power Control in Optical Networks

      Research Article in 2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

      Nem Stefanovic, Lacra Pavel

      Abstract
      We analyze the stability of a game-theoretic based power control algorithm for optical networks in the presence of time-delays. The control objective is to achieve optimal optical signal to noise rat…We analyze the stability of a game-theoretic based power control algorithm for optical networks in the presence of time-delays. The control objective is to achieve optimal optical signal to noise ratio (OSNR) values for the signal channels. The control algorithms regularly adjust the signal powers entering the network based on a game-theoretic model. Each signal power is modeled as a player, whose goal is to maximize its own utility function. The utility function increases with an increasing OSNR value, and hence requires an increasing signal power. The trade-off is that if one player increases its OSNR value, this adversely affects the OSNR values of all of the other players. In addition to the signal powers, a dynamic price parameter is fed back to the power control algorithms. Time-delay is present for both the channel pricing parameter and the OSNR feedbacks in the network. We study the stability of the closed loop, time-delay system. The work utilizes singular perturbation theory modified to handle Lyapunov-Krasovskii techniques.
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    • A Game-Theoretic Approach to Decentralized Optimal Power Allocation for Cellular Networks

      Research Article in 2nd International ICST Workshop on Game Theory in Communication Networks

      Shrutivandana Sharma, Demosthenis Teneketzis

      Abstract
      The rapidly growing demand for wireless communication makes efficient power allocation a critical factor in the network's efficient operation. Power allocation in cellular networks with interference,…The rapidly growing demand for wireless communication makes efficient power allocation a critical factor in the network's efficient operation. Power allocation in cellular networks with interference, where users are selfish, has been recently studied by pricing methods. However, pricing methods do not result in efficient/optimal power allocations for such systems for the following reason. Because of interference, the communication between the BS and a given user is affected by that between the BS and all other users. Thus, the vector consisting of the transmission power in each BS-user link can be viewed as a public good which simultaneously affects the utilities of all the users in the network. It is well known [11, Chapter 11.C] that in public good economies, standard efficiency theorems on market equilibrium do not apply and pricing mechanisms do not result in globally optimal allocations. In this paper we study power allocation in the presence of interference for a single cell wireless CDMA network from a game theoretic perspective. We consider a network where each user knows only its own utility and the channel gain from the base station to itself. We formulate the downlink power allocation problem as a public good allocation problem. We present a game form the Nash Equilibria of which yield power allocations that are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized downlink network.
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