Research Article
Self, Social and Monopoly Optimization in Observable Queues
@INPROCEEDINGS{10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274469, author={Ran Izhak Snitkovsky and Refael Hassin}, title={Self, Social and Monopoly Optimization in Observable Queues}, proceedings={11th EAI International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools}, publisher={ACM}, proceedings_a={VALUETOOLS}, year={2018}, month={8}, keywords={rational qeueing observable queues}, doi={10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274469} }- Ran Izhak Snitkovsky
Refael Hassin
Year: 2018
Self, Social and Monopoly Optimization in Observable Queues
VALUETOOLS
ACM
DOI: 10.4108/eai.5-12-2017.2274469
Abstract
Naor's (1969) celebrated paper studies customer decisions in an observable M/M/1 queue where the utility is a linear function of queue length, and derives the optimal threshold strategies for the individual, social planner and monopoly. The optimal threshold imposed by a monopoly is not greater than the socially optimal threshold, which is not greater than the individual's threshold. Studies show that this triangular relation holds in a more general setup where the utility function is not necessarily linear. Many of these extensions share common features. We point out conditions that imply the aforementioned result, and apply them to a new model motivated by order-driven markets. In the new model, customers choose between joining and balking when they might be forced to abandon the system before service completion, and their utility depends on the service completion probability, which is not linear in the observed queue size.