sesa 18(14): e3

Research Article

An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks

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  • @ARTICLE{10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771,
        author={Zheng Wang and Shui Yu and Scott Rose},
        title={An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks},
        journal={EAI Endorsed Transactions on Security and Safety},
        volume={4},
        number={14},
        publisher={EAI},
        journal_a={SESA},
        year={2018},
        month={5},
        keywords={NS Security Extensions, DNS cache poisoning, model checking, query load, success rate.},
        doi={10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771}
    }
    
  • Zheng Wang
    Shui Yu
    Scott Rose
    Year: 2018
    An On-Demand Defense Scheme Against DNS Cache Poisoning Attacks
    SESA
    EAI
    DOI: 10.4108/eai.15-5-2018.154771
Zheng Wang1,*, Shui Yu2, Scott Rose1
  • 1: National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899, USA
  • 2: School of Information Technology, Deakin University, Burwood, VIC 3125, Australia
*Contact email: zhengwang98@gmail.com

Abstract

The threats of caching poisoning attacks largely stimulate the deployment of DNSSEC. Being a strong but demanding cryptographical defense, DNSSEC has its universal adoption predicted to go through a lengthy transition. Thus the DNSSEC practitioners call for a secure yet lightweight solution to speed up DNSSEC deployment while offering an acceptable DNSSEC-like defense. This paper proposes a new On-Demand Defense (ODD) scheme against cache poisoning attacks, still using but lightly using DNSSEC. In the solution, DNS operates in DNSSEC-oblivious mode unless a potential attack is detected and triggers a switch to DNSSEC-aware mode. The modeling checking results demonstrate that only a small DNSSEC query load is needed by the ODD scheme to ensure a small enough cache poisoning success rate.