A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks

Hua  Liu; Bhaskar  Krishnamachari

1st International ICST Workshop on Game Theory for Networks

Research Article

A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks

Cite: BibTeX Plain Text

@INPROCEEDINGS{10.1145/1190195.1190201,
    author={Hua  Liu and Bhaskar  Krishnamachari},
    title={A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks},
    proceedings={1st International ICST Workshop on Game Theory for Networks},
    publisher={ACM},
    proceedings_a={GAMENETS},
    year={2012},
    month={4},
    keywords={},
    doi={10.1145/1190195.1190201}
}

Hua Liu
Bhaskar Krishnamachari
Year: 2012
A price-based reliable routing game in wireless networks
GAMENETS
ACM
DOI: 10.1145/1190195.1190201

Hua Liu¹^,*, Bhaskar Krishnamachari¹^,*

1: Departments of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, Viterbi School of Engineering, University Of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA 90089

*Contact email: hual@usc.edu, bkrishna@usc.edu

Abstract

We investigate a price-based reliable routing game in a wireless network of selfish users. Each node is characterized by a probability of reliably forwarding a packet, and each link is characterized by a cost of transmission. The objective is to form a stable and reliable routing path between a given source and destination pair. The pricing mechanism involved in this routing game is destination-driven and source-mediated: for each successfully delivered packet, the destination node pays the source, which in turn compensates all nodes that participate in routing the packet. We develop a polynomial-time algorithm for deriving an efficient Nash equilibrium routing path. We also present simulations to evaluate the reliability of the obtained path with respect to prices and source-destination cooperation for different network settings.

Published: 2012-04-04
Publisher: ACM

: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1190195.1190201