Wireless Internet. 10th International Conference, WiCON 2017, Tianjin, China, December 16-17, 2017, Proceedings

Research Article

Optimal Smart Prepayment for Mobile Access Service via Stackelberg Game

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  • @INPROCEEDINGS{10.1007/978-3-319-90802-1_4,
        author={Yuan Wu and Haowei Mao and Xiaowei Yang and Liping Qian and Weidang Lu and Liang Huang},
        title={Optimal Smart Prepayment for Mobile Access Service via Stackelberg Game},
        proceedings={Wireless Internet. 10th International Conference, WiCON 2017, Tianjin, China, December 16-17, 2017, Proceedings},
        proceedings_a={WICON},
        year={2018},
        month={5},
        keywords={Smart pricing Mobile network service Optimization Stackelberg game},
        doi={10.1007/978-3-319-90802-1_4}
    }
    
  • Yuan Wu
    Haowei Mao
    Xiaowei Yang
    Liping Qian
    Weidang Lu
    Liang Huang
    Year: 2018
    Optimal Smart Prepayment for Mobile Access Service via Stackelberg Game
    WICON
    Springer
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-90802-1_4
Yuan Wu1,*, Haowei Mao1,*, Xiaowei Yang1,*, Liping Qian1,*, Weidang Lu1,*, Liang Huang1,*
  • 1: Zhejiang University of Technology
*Contact email: iewuy@zjut.edu.cn, hwmao_zjut@163.com, xwyang_zjut@163.com, lpqian@zjut.edu.cn, luweid@zjut.edu.cn, lianghuang@zjut.edu.cn

Abstract

In this paper we propose a smart prepayment for mobile access network Service Provider (SP) to charge End-Users (EUs). Prepayment is a desirable charging approach, since it helps the SP to reduce its loss in bad-debt and capital devaluation. Meanwhile, Quality of Service (QoS) is a major concern from the EUs’ perspective, especially when they have heavy traffic demands and suffer from network congestion due to limited access bandwidths. Our proposed prepayment thus aims at improving both the SP’s economic reward and the EUs’ QoS. To analyze the benefit from the proposed prepayment scheme, we model the interaction between the SP and the EUs as a Stackelberg game, which is based on the rationale that improved QoS will be an incentive for the EUs to prepay. In this game model, the SP plays as a leader and determines its prepayment policy to optimize its reward, and the EU plays as a game follower and determines its prepaid amount as a response to the SP’s policy. The equilibrium of this game model strongly depends on the EUs’ traffic load level, which we quantify and analyze in depth. Our results show that both of the SP and the EUs can benefit from the equilibrium of the game model, implying that the proposed prepayment scheme will yield a desirable win-win outcome.